UNCITRAL Draft Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea, Part 4 by Sweeney, Joseph
Fordham Law School
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Faculty Scholarship
1975
UNCITRAL Draft Convention on Carriage of
Goods by Sea, Part 4
Joseph Sweeney
Fordham University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joseph Sweeney, UNCITRAL Draft Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea, Part 4, 7 J. Mar. L. 615 (1975)
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/825
The UNCITRAL Draft Convention on Carriage
of Goods by Sea (Part IV)*
JOSEPH C. SWEENEY**
Maritime Law should be the child of commerce rather than the father.
L. Elimination of Invalid Clauses in Bills of Lading
In 1974, as in 1924, it was easy to achieve theoretical unanimity with
the proposition that invalid clauses in bills of lading were objectionable
and created uncertainty because of their tendency to mislead cargo
interests, prolong claim negotiations, and encourage unnecessary litiga-
tion, however, there was considerable disagreement as to whether or not
any sanctions should be included as a penalty for using an invalid clause.
The Sixth Working Group Session Report stated that "a majority of the
representatives were in favor of including a sanction, but no clear
consensus was reached on the form of this sanction."'170 There was
support for removal of the unit limitation of liability, but most delegates
thought this "excessive."' 17 Delegations favoring sanctions were in favor
* This is the fourth of five parts of the study of the new draft convention. The first part appeared
in 7 J. Mar. L. & Comm. 69-125 (1975), the second part in 7 J. Mar. L. & Comm. 327-350(1976)
and the third part in 7 J. Mar. L. & Comm. 487-503 (1976).
** Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law, Member of the Editorial Board,
United States Representative to the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Sessions of the
UNCITRAL Working Group and the Tenth Session of the Commission, April 1976 and the
UNCTAD Working Group on International Shipping Legislation considering the draft convention.
The author is grateful for the assistance of his students, Michael J. Egelhof and Thomas J. Hawley
of the class of 1975, Fordham Law School.
217 Report of the Working Group on the Work of its Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 9/88 of 29
March 1974, para. 85 at 33.
171 Id, para. 86 at 33. The preparatory report for the session prepared by the Secretariat, Third
Report of the Secretary General on Responsibility of Ocean Carriers for Cargo; Bills of Lading;
Part Four. U.N. Doc. A/CN. 9/WG III/W.P. 12 (Vol. 3) of 30 November, 1973, had proposed this
alternative at para. 14,
Draft Proposal B (Alternative 1)
"The carrier shall not be entitled to the benefit of the limitations on liability provided for in
article (6) of this Convention if he asserts in a judicial or arbitral proceedings any clause in
the (contract of carriage) (bill of lading) which is clearly inconsistent with ( ).
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of a provision rendering the carrier liable for "all expenses, loss or
damage caused by an invalid clause."' 172 There was considerable
disapproval of a provision that would permit assessment of legal fees
against the party using an invalid clause on the ground that the "costs"
of litigation should be determined by national law. 173 However, a large
majority of representatives favored a notice provision in the contract of
carriage stating that any clause derogating from the Convention would
be null and void, but there was little support for a sanction if such a
notice clause was omitted from the contract. 74
The Hague Rules had specifically outlawed the carrier's "benefit of
insurance clause", and the United States Supreme Court had found the
"both to blame collision clause" to violate public policy. 75 Nevertheless
dubious clauses had not disappeared from the bill of lading despite the
clear language of the Hague Rules that clauses which lessen the carrier's
liability otherwise than as provided in the Convention shall be, ". . . null
and void and of no effect. .... 176 Of course, one good reason for
retention of possibly invalid clauses was that one never knew where the
bill of lading dispute would be litigated, and since there was always a
chance that it would be sustained, dubious clauses could be retained since
there was no sanction for their continued presence in the bill of lading.
The approach of the Secretariat was that the best legislative approach
would be to make it crystal-clear that bill of lading clauses inconsistent
with the Convention would be invalid where there was a derogation from
1723 Sec. Gen. Rpt. (fn. 171 supra) at paras. 17-18.
Draft Proposal B (Alternative 2)
"The carrier shall be liable for all expenses, loss or damage resulting from a clause which is
null and void by virtue of [this article].
173 Report of the Sixth Session ( see fn. 170 supra) at para. 87, at 33.
124 Id, paras. 89-92 at 34.
The elimination of the limitation of liability as a sanction was reported to have caused
considerable complications in the Warsaw Convention and has been deleted from the recent
Montreal, 1975 revision as to passengers. The text adopted resembles the sanction of the
European Road Convention (C.M.R.), Article 7, para. 3.
175 U.S. v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co., 343 U.S. 236 (1952).
'
7 6 H.R. Art. III (8); U.S. COGSA, 46 U.S.C. 1303(8)
"Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving the carrier or the
ship from liability for loss or damage to, or in connection with, goods arising from negligence,
fault, or failure in the duties and obligations provided in this article or lessening such liabil-
ity otherwise than as provided in this Convention, shall be null and void and of no effect. A
benefit of insurance clause in favour of the carrier or similar clause shall be deemed to be a
clause relieving the carrier from liability."
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a mandatory provision. 177 Unfortunately, the Hague Rules provision
could not be copied into the new Convention because it referred only to
the provisions on liability and did not deal with the question of the
validity of the remainder of the bill of lading where invalid or potentially
invalid clauses were included.
Poland, however, believed that the Secretariat's Draft Proposal did
not contain sufficient room for party autonomy, since the parties might
have good reasons for derogating from the Convention, accordingly it
would be desirable to distinguish mandatory provisions of the Conven-
tion from those which were merely permissive.
The Soviet Union took the position that since all provisions of the
Convention would be mandatory it would be unnecessary to have
provisions such as Draft Proposal A concerning clauses which deviated
from the mandatory provisions. Furthermore, neither alternative sanc-
tion was acceptable in this view, nor was there any need for a notice
provision on the application of the Convention.
Japan also disapproved any sanction provision as well as a notice
provision, but felt the Secretariat's Draft Proposal A could be accepta-
ble.
Norway stressed the complementary nature of the three Secretariat
Draft Proposals and endorsed the need for Draft Proposal A, outlawing
invalid clauses only to the extent they derogated from the Convention,
and endorsed Draft Proposal C regarding notice as a mandatory
provision only if a document were to be issued. The extreme sanction of
177 Draft Proposal
1. Any clause or stipulation in the [bill of lading] [contract of carriage] shall be null
and void to the extent that it derogates from the provisions of this Convention. The nullity
of such a clause or stipulation shall not affect the validity of the other provisions of the con-
tract of which it forms a part. A clause assigning benefit of insurance of the goods in favour
of the carrier shall be deemed to derogate from the provisions of this Convention.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article, a carrier may increase
his responsibilities and obligations under this Convention provided such increase shall be
embodied in the [contract of carriage] [bill of lading issued to the shipper].
Draft Proposal C
"1. Every [bill of lading] [contract of carriage] shall contain a statement that: (a) the
carriage is subject to the provisions of this Convention, and, (b) that any clause of the [bill of
lading] [contract of carriage] shall be null and void to the extent that it derogates from the
provisions of this Convention."
"2. If the [bill of lading] [contract of carriage] does not contain the statement specified
in paragraph 1 (a) and (b) the carrier shall not be entitled to the benefit of the limitation of
liability provided for in article ( ) of this Convention."
Hague Rules 617July 1976
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Draft Proposal B (alternative 1) (loss of unit limitation of liability) was
disapproved as too extreme.
Only India approved of the loss of unit limitation as a sanction for
invalid clauses. The United Kingdom did not approve any sanction nor
the notice provision, in view of the universal knowledge of the
applicability of the Hague Rules after fifty years. A majority supported
the Norwegian view of the complementary nature of the three Draft
Proposals, with clear support for Draft Proposals A and C and a
toleration of some form of sanction along the lines of Draft Proposal B
(alternative 2). This majority consisted of Hungary, Belgium, Nigeria,
Australia, Chile, Argentina, the United States and France.
Argentina had been concerned that the introductory language of Draft
Proposal A was unnecessarily restrictive in that it applied only to clauses
in either the bill of lading or the contract of carriage, and believed the
language should be as broad as possible. This view was also held by
Singapore which feared that collateral agreements might not be included
which would vary the Convention terms if they appeared in other
documents such as booking notes or freight agreements. Norway
supported these proposals and the United States offered an amendment
to the first sentence of Draft Proposal A as follows,
"Any stipulation of a contract of carriage or contained in a bill of lading
or any other document evidencing the contract of carriage, shall be null
and void to the extent it derogates from the provisions of the Convention."
Although there was general agreement to this amendment, Tanzania
noted that the Convention was already too complicated even for lawyers,
and that these provisions should be made even clearer so that the
Convention and its effect on commercial transactions could be under-
stood by commercial men without the use of lawyers.
The United States endorsed the need for Draft Proposal A in view of
the experience that bills of lading continued to offer very dubious clauses
to shippers, 178 however, the United States doubted that Draft Proposal
78 For decisions striking down bill of lading clauses as lessening carrier liability prohibited by
COGSA 1303 (8) see: General Foods Corp. v. The Troubador, 98 F.Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1951);
Petition of the United States, 105 F.Supp 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Nashiwa v. Matson Navigation Co.,
116 F.Supp. 897 (D.C. Hawaii 1953); Spanish American Skin Co. v. The M.S. Ferngulf, 143
F.Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) aff'd. 242 F.2d 551 (2nd Cir. 1956); Karobi Lumber Co. v. S.S.
Norco, 249 F.Supp. 324 (S.D.Ala., 1966) aff'd. 397 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1967); Holden v. S.S. Kendall
Fish, 262 F.Supp. 862 (E.D.La., 1966) aff'd. 395 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1967); Horn v. Cia. de
Navegacion Fruco S.A., 404 F.2d. 422 (5th Cir. 1968) cert. denied 394 U.S. 943 (1969). See
generally U.S. v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. 343 U.S. 236 (1952), and Indussa Corp. v. S.S.
Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967). See also Holden v. S.S. Kendal Fish, 395 F.2d 910 (5th Cir.
1968) in which COGSA 1303(8) is used to invalidate a clause which might have increased rather
than lessened carrier liability.
Vol. 7. No. 4
C, the notice provision, could ever be clear enough so that laymen,
unassisted by lawyers, could appreciate their rights under it. Further-
more, there might be endless disputes about the shipper's or consignee's
knowledge of the applicability of the Convention under Draft Proposal C
if nothing were said about the language of the notification; finally, the
two sanction proposals were not adequate to the problem in that
Proposal B (Alt. 1) left a measure of uncertainty in that it applied the
drastic sanction only when the invalid clause was "clearly inconsistent"
and Proposal B (Alt. 2) might interfere with public policy against
imposing costs on the losing party in litigation, as was the case in the
United States. Draft Proposal C was opposed, in summary, as a needless
burden on documentation.
France proposed that the language of the notice under Draft Proposal
C would always be the language of the contract, whatever that was, and
that there could be a sanction for its absence causally connected to
damage, as in the C.M.R. Convention. Since Draft Proposal B (Alt. 2)
resembled French law, it also could be approved, but with respect to
Draft Proposal A, France offered to amend the language with a
non-exhaustive list of forbidden clauses, modeled on Article 29 of the
recent French statute.179 This last proposal was disapproved by Norway,
Australia, Japan, Belgium, India and the United States, although both
the United States and the United Kingdom pointed out that since the
benefit of insurance clause had been singled out for mention in the Hague
Rules it would have to be mentioned in the new Convention, lest the
erroneous conclusion be drawn that the benefit of insurance clause was
now approved after fifty years of invalidity.
The UNIDROIT observer also brought up the problems of the
mandatory notice provision with sanction in the Warsaw Convention,
... French Proposal (A/CN.9/WG. III (VI)/CRP. 24
I. Any clause in a contract of carriage contained in a bill of lading or any other document
shall be null and void to the extent that it derogates from the provisions of this Convention.
The nullity of such a clause or stipulation shall not affect the validity of the other provisions
of the contract of which it forms part.
2. In particular, any clause is null and void if its purpose or effect is:
(a) to relieve the carrier of the liability defined in article [XI either by granting him special
exemption clauses which are not in accord with the provisions of the article or by reversing
the burden of proof, which rests with the carrier;
(b) to limit the liability of the carrier to a sum or sums lower than the sum or sums pre-
scribed in article [Y];
(c) to free the carrier of his obligation to deliver the goods to the consignee as prescribed in
the article;
(d) to assign to the carrier the benefit of insurance on the good.
The United States noted its reservations to this list because of the great difficulty courts had with
differentiating "inclusive lists" ("Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius") from "'illustrative lists"
("Eiusdem generis").
Hague Rules 619July 1976
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and noted that the C.M.R. provision had been prepared by UNIDROIT
and the Economic Commission for Europe to ensure that the carrier
would not be deprived of unit limitation of liability when omission of the
mandatory statements had not been connected with the damage sus-
tained. Since the C.M.R. text had proved satisfactory, UNCITRAL
need not "reinvent the umbrella" but rather should follow the C.M.R.
text.
The Chairman's summary showed a clear majority in favor of Draft
Proposal A, with nuances to be elaborated by a Drafting Party, whereas
Draft Proposal B (alternative 1) was clearly rejected while only a few
states actively opposed Draft Proposal B (alternative 2) and a slight
majority seemed to prefer Draft Proposal C.
The Drafting Party recommended the following text which was
approved, with amendments by the Working Group.
1. Any stipulation on the contract of carriage or contained in a bill of
lading or any other document evidencing the contract of carriage shall
be null and void to the extent that it derogates, directly or indirectly,
from the provisions of this Convention. The nullity of such a stipulation
shall not affect the validity of the other provisions of the contract or
document of which it forms a part. A clause assigning benefit of
insurance of the goods in favour of the carrier or any similar clause
shall be null and void.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph I of this article, a carrier
may increase his responsibilities and obligations under this Convention.
3. When a bill of lading or any other document evidencing the contract of
carriage is issued, it shall contain a statement that the carriage is
subject to the provisions of the Convention which nullify any stipula-
tion derogating therefrom to the detriment of the shipper or the
consignee.
4. Where the claimant in respect of the goods has incurred loss as a result
of a stipulation which is null and void by virtue of the present Article,
or as a result of the omission of the statement referred to in the
preceding paragraph, the carrier shall pay compensation to the extent
required in order to give the claimant full compensation in accordance
with the provisions of this Convention for any loss of or damage to the
goods as well as for delay in delivery. The carrier shall, in addition, pay
compensation for costs incurred by the claimant for the purpose of
exercising his right, provided, that costs incurred in the action where
the foregoing provision is invoked shall be determined in accordance
with the law of the court seized of the case.
These provisions are now incorporated in Article 23 of the Draft
Convention.
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M. Reconsideration of Deck Cargo and Live Animals
Reconsideration of these issues took place during the Sixth Session of
the Working Group and during the Second Reading. 180 This proved to be
a very contentious issue and is certain to provoke further debate at the
UNCITRAL Plenary in 1976 and the subsequent Diplomatic Confer-
ence. The provisions of the Draft Convention respecting deck cargo are
now to be found in Article 9, and the provisions on live animals in Arti-
cle 5.
The Third Session of the Working Group had revised the definition of
"goods" in Article 1(c) of the 1924 Convention so as not to exclude the
carriage of cargo on deck from the coverage or the Convention, but there
was no consensus on all issues before the Group.
The Working Group considered two proposals left over from 1972:
Pending Proposal A:
"In respect of cargo which by contract of carriage is stated as being carried
on deck and is so carried, all risks of loss or damage arising or resulting from
perils inherent in or incident to such carriage shall be borne by the shipper
and the consignee but in other respects the custody and carriage of such cargo
shall be governed by the terms of the Convention."
The exculpatory nature of this provision was apparent and in view of the
reframing of the basic rule on liability and the carrier's burden of
proof,1 8 ' there was a consensus that such a provision was now
unnecessary. France, Hungary and Norway specifically opposed it, and
there was no support for it.
"I The first discussion of these topics is reported in Part I of this article, 7 J. Mar. L. & Comm.
84-93.
18 See Part I of this article, 7 J. Mar. L. & Comm. 102-17.
Because of the problem of inadvertent application of COGSA to on deck carriage, carriers in
United States foreign trade customarily add a Deck Cargo Clause to the bill of lading, as follows:
Deck cargo (if stated herein to be so carried) and live animals are received and carried
solely at Shipper's and Consignee's risk (including accident or mortality of animals), and the
Carrier shall not in any event be liable for any loss or damage thereto arising or resulting
from any matters mentioned in Section 4, Sub-section 2(a) to (p) inclusive, of the United
States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, or from any other cause whatsoever not due to the fault
of the Carrier, any warranty of seaworthiness in the premises being hereby waived, and the
burden of proving liability being in all respects upon the Shipper or Consignee. Except as
provided above, such shipments shall be deemed goods, and shall be subject to all terms and
provisions in this bill of lading relating to goods.
(Selection 8 from C. Powers, A Practical Guide to Bills of Lading, 67 (1966).
Hague Rules 621July 1976
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Pending Proposal B was made up, in the first place, of three
propositions for which there had been consensus in 1972:
(a) The carrier shall be entitled to carry the goods on deck only if such
carriage is in accordance with an agreement with the shipper, or with
statutory requirements, and possibly with usage.
(b) Any agreement between the carrier and the shipper to the effect
that the goods can or may be carried on deck must be reflected in a state-
ment in the bill of lading.
(c) If the bill of lading does not contain the statement referred to in
paragraph (b) above, it shall be presumed that the carrier and shipper have
not entered into such an agreement, but as against the shipper, the carrier
shall be entitled to prove and invoke the true agreement.
These points of agreement are reflected in the first two paragraphs of
Pending Proposal B together with a fourth proposition to which there
had been some opposition in 1972:
(d) If an agreement with the shipper that cargo shall be carried on
deck is not reflected in the bill of lading, then the carrier shall not be en-
titled to invoke such agreement against a consignee who has acquired the
bill of lading in good faith.
These four points were combined into two paragraphs of Pending
Proposal B, as follows:
"I. The carrier shall be entitled to carry the goods on deck only if such
carriage is in accordance with an agreement with the shipper, with usage
or with statutory requirements.
"2. If the carrier and the shipper have agreed that the goods shall or may
be carried on deck, the carrier shall insert in the bill of lading a statement
to that effect. In the absence of such a statement the carrier shall have the
burden of proving that an agreement for carriage on deck has been entered
into; however, the carrier shall not be entitled to invoke such an agreement
against a third party who has acquired the bill of lading in good faith.
Furthermore, the Secretariat draft had taken the fifth proposition
(which had evoked the most criticism of carrier states) and worked it into
a complex proposal dealing in one paragraph with several sets of
practical problems."12 The fifth proposition was,
(e) If goods are carried on deck in breach of the principles referred to
in paragraph (a) above, then the carrier shall be liable for all losses direct
and indirect of on-deck stowage.
"' See Report of the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG. III/W.P. 14 of 28 November
1973.
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The Secretariat's Pending Proposal read as follows:
"3. Where the goods have been carried on deck contrary to the provisions
of paragraph 1, the carrier shall be liable for loss of or damage to the
goods which result solely from the carriage on deck in accordance with the
provisions of [-(unit limitation)]. The same shall apply when the carrier in
accordance with paragraph 2 of this article is not entitled to invoke an
agreement for carriage on deck.
There was never any question that deck carriage was permissible under
certain circumstances, but the United States was opposed to the
generalization of paragraph 3 from the outset, believing that it did not
properly treat the question of the shipper whose goods required
under-deck carriage and who had sought and obtained the agreement of
the carrier to carry such goods under-deck, but nevertheless suffered
losses because the goods had been actually carried on deck. 183
Norway disagreed with the view that unauthorized stowage on deck
would be a serious breach of contract, even with an express agreement to
the contrary, because the serious nature of contract breach should be
determined by the nature of the voyage and the cargo, not by a rule
imposing unlimited liability for such a deviation. Unlimited liability of
the carrier would be justified only for wilful misconduct, where the
carrier deliberately rather than carelessly stowed under-deck cargo
on-deck. The risk to cargo from an on-deck voyage in sheltered coastal
waters would be smaller than on an ocean voyage and should not justify
unlimited liability. Poland, Belgium, U.K., U.S.S.R., Japan and Aus-
tralia agreed with Norway.
The United States, however, felt that motion of the vessel and danger
of jettison were not the only risks of on-deck stowage and that exposure
to sun or heat and cold might be the risk sought to be avoided by the
shipper who demanded under-deck stowage. The I.U.M.I. observer
agreed that such agreements of shipper and carrier must be honored and
that serious consequences must result for breach of such agreements. He
felt that uniform rules of world-wide application should be applied to
this problem, although there should not be many exceptions to the sys-
tem of limited liability in the Convention. Singapore, Ghana, Tanzania,
13 In United States law such serious breach of the contract of carriage is regarded as a deviation
which ousts the bill of lading and makes the carrier an insurer without benefit of the unit limitation
of liability. See Encyclopedia Brittanica v. Hong Kong Producer, 422 F.2d 7 (2nd Cir. cert. denied
397 U.S. 964 (1970). See also Iligan Integrated Steel Co. v. John Weyerhaeuser Co., 507 F.2d 68
(2d. Cir. 1974). Deck storage of a container in a specially built container vessel or a "containerized"
vessel is not regarded as an unreasonable deviation. See E. L DuPont de Nemours Co., Inc. v. SS
Mormacvega, 493 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1974).
Hague Rules 623July 1976
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India, Nigeria, Argentina and Chile agreed with the United States posi-
tion. 184
France favored deletion of all three paragraphs, and the treatment of
all questions of deck cargo by the general liability rules. In their view,
carrier violation of an agreement to stow under-deck would be fraud
which would vitiate any limitation of liability.
Norway then noted that there could not be limited liability for wilful
misconduct, but that the degree of the breach must always be assessed in
the light of all circumstances. The United States noted, in agreement
with Norway and India, that there was no suggestion that every carriage
of cargo on deck in violation of some trade custom would result in
unlimited liability, but that shippers must be entitled to special
protection when they have demanded the special protection of under-
deck stow (ie: in conventional, non-containerized vessels).
It was not possible to obtain a consensus because at first 9 states
favored the U.S. position and 8 states favored Pending Proposal B;
however 7 states favored the U.S. Proposal while 10 states favored
Pending Proposal B in another version of the same vote. The chairman
referred the entire matter to the Drafting Group to attempt to achieve a
compromise text. The attempts at compromise did not resolve all
disagreements, and the Report reflected the opinions of some delegates
that the protection of shippers and consignees in paragraphs 3 and 4 were
inadequate,"8 5 while others continued to believe that paragraphs 2, 3 and
4 should be bracketed as unnecessary.1 86
184 U.S. Proposal respecting Deck Cargo
1. The carrier shall be entitled to carry the, goods on deck only if such carriage is in
accordance with an agreement with the shipper, or with statutory rules or regulations [or
usage].
2. If the carrier and the shipper have agreed that the goods shall or may be carried on
deck the carrier shall insert in the contract of carriage or bill of lading or other document
evidencing the contract of carriage a statement to that effect. In the absence of such a
statement included or endorsed on the bill of lading or other similar document of title the
carrier shall have the burden of proving that an agreement for carriage on deck has been
entered into; however, the carrier shall not be entitled to invoke such an agreement against a
third party who has acquired the bill of lading or other document of title in good faith.
3. Where loss or damage occurs to goods carried on deck contrary to the provision of
paragraph 1, the liability of the carrier for loss, damage or expense shall be determined
without reference to Article [Part 5 of Secretariat Compilation of Draft Provisions].
Additional Article
2. The carrier shall not be entitled to the benefit of the limitation of liability provided for
in paragraph I of Articlj A if loss or damage occurs to goods carried on deck contrary to the
provisions of paragraph, I of Article [Article on Deck Cargo].
185 Report of the Sixth Session (fn. 170 supra) para. 105(e) at 41.
le Id. para. 105(d) at 41.
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During the Drafting Group's work there was a discussion of the
various trades, such as lumber, timber, chemicals and some live animal
trades such as elephants, where it was established practice to carry
on-deck. Australia proposed the phrase "common usage of the particular
trade" to describe these situations, however, India, Ghana and France
had serious objections to it and eventually the adjective "common" was
eliminated.
The following text was eventually approved by the Working Group as
a compromise, and is now found in Article 9 of the draft Convention:
Article 9. Deck cargo
1. The carrier shall be entitled to carry the goods on deck only if such
carriage is in accordance with an agreement with the shipper, with the
usage of the particular trade or with statutory rules or regulations.
2. If the carrier and the shipper have agreed that the goods shall or may
be carried on deck, the carrier shall insert in the bill of lading or other
document evidencing the contract of carriage a statement to that effect. In
the absence of such a statement the carrier shall have the burden of
proving that an agreement for carriage on deck has been entered into;
however, the carrier shall not be entitled to invoke such an agreement
against a third party who has acquired a bill of lading in good faith.
3. Where the goods have been carried on deck contrary to the provisions
of paragraph I of this article, the carrier shall be liable for loss of or
damage to the goods, as well as for delay in delivery, which results solely
from the carriage on deck, in accordance with the provisions of articles 6
and 8. The same shall apply when the carrier, in accordance with
paragraph 2 of this article, is not entitled to invoke an agreement for
carriage on deck against a third party who has acquired a bill of lading in
good faith.
4. Carriage of goods on deck contrary to express agreement for the
carriage under deck shall be deemed to be an act or omission of the carrier
within the meaning of article 8.
As a result of a study requested by the Commission and prepared by
the UNIDROIT, 1" three alternative proposals were considered by the
Working Group:
The first concentrated on the problems of special risks involved in live
animal carriage, and it proposed that a clause be added to Article 3(8) of
the Hague Rules:
"However, with respect to the carriage of live animals, all agreements,
convenants or clauses relating to liability and compensation arising out of
the risks inherent in such carriage shall be permitted in the contract of
carriage."
187The Report of UNIDROIT, prepared by M. Hennebicq and presented by him, was
6ummarized in the Report of the Sixth Session (fn 170 supra) paras. 107-09 at 42-43.
Hague Rules 625July 1976
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The second proposal, while relieving the carrier of special risks
inherent in the carriage of live animals, would place the burden on the
carrier of proving that the loss or damage was caused by such inherent
risks:
"With respect to live animals, the carrier shall be relieved of his
responsibility where the loss or damage results from the special risks
inherent in the carriage of animals. When the carrier proves that, in the
circumstances of the case, the loss or damage could be attributed to such
risks, it shall be presumed that the loss or damage was so caused, unless
there is conflicting proof that such risks were not the whole or partial
cause of it. Furthermore, the carrier shall prove that all steps incumbent
on him in the circumstances were taken and that he complied with any
special instructions issued to him."
The third proposal brought live animal carriage under the general
rules of liability of the Convention, but a paragraph would be added to
Article 4(6) of the Hague Rules requiring notice by the shipper to the
carrier of the nature of the danger in the carriage of particular animals
and the steps that may be taken by the carrier if such animals become a
danger. This was the solution preferred by UNIDROIT.
"Before live animals are taken in charge by the carrier, the shipper shall
inform the carrier of the exact nature of the danger which they may
present and indicate, if need be, the precautions to be taken. If such
animals become a danger to the ship and the cargo, they may, at any time
before discharge, be landed at any place or rendered harmless or killed,
without liability on the part of the carrier except to general average, if any,
provided that he prove that he unsuccessfully took all measures that could
reasonably be required in the circumstances of the case."
Australia endorsed the third proposal, without the proposed language,
noting that it exported about one million live animals per year, yet did
not believe special treatment of live animals to be justified. Argentina,
Ghana and Tanzania agreed with Australia.
The I.C.S. observer said that live animals were not hazardous cargo
because of the truly unique problems that can arise, referring to the case
of the herbivorous rhinoceros which chewed off the arm of a crew
member. Specifically he noted that there would be no way to establish
cause of death when an animal died at sea, and attendants usually
blamed the carrier in order to exculpate themselves.
The United Kingdom urged that there be no change from the Hague
Rules exclusion of live animals, noting in passing that the health and
safety aspects were regulated by the Paris Convention. 188
188 European Convention for the Protection of Animals During Transport, Dec. 13, 1968. 2
Euro. Cony. & Agr. 374.
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France favored the first proposal and opposed the second and third
proposals, since the new convention should apply to live animals, subject
to reasonable exculpatory clauses. Poland agreed.
Brazil preferred the second proposal to relieve the carrier of special
risks inherent in live animal carriage. This was supported by Nigeria,
Japan, 189 Chile, Norway and U.S.S.R. Norway justified live animal
carriage by sea as being different from other carriage conventions
because the journeys lasted longer, without opportunities for off-loading
diseased animals.
The United States agreed that addition of a special provision dealing
with live animals was justified, but, in the absence of statistical
information about losses during the carriage of live animals, it was very
difficult to choose the most appropriate solution. The first proposal
opened the way to very broad exculpatory clauses by the carrier. The
third proposal seemed unlikely to promote uniformity and would
encourage litigation, thus the second proposal was the best of the
alternatives, but did not adequately deal with the problem of special
instructions: would the carrier's responsibility be diminished if the
shipper provided no instructions? Belgium also disapproved of the three
alternatives, but felt that the second proposal could be the basis of a
compromise text.
Some delegations believed that an official manual prepared, perhaps
by IMCO, on the carriage of live animals noting their characteristics and
recommendations for care should be required in order to make the third
proposal more acceptable.
The I.U.M.I. observer explained the insurance provisions which
differentiated between live animals and other cargo because of the factor
of the animals own activities, and that the length of sea voyages caused
different risk calculations than those used in rail, road and air transport.
Marine insurers would not provide all-risk cover for live animals but
restricted the cover to such risks as grounding, sinking and fire. Because
of the impossibility of ascertaining whether loss was due to bad handling
or inherent risks, cargo insurers were unlikely to increase the coverage,
and additional carrier liability would have to be met by special "P. & I."
clubs.
The Chairman summarized the discussion, concluding that the first
proposal had been rejected but that it was impossible to make an
accurate tally of the shifting and alternative preferences involved in the
... Japan proposed the addition of the following sentence to the second proposal,
"The carrier shall be liable when the claimant proves that the loss of or damage to the live
animals was due to fault or negligence on the part of the carrier, his servants or agents."
Hague Rules 627July 1976
628 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce
second and third proposals. Accordingly, both proposals were sent to the
Drafting Party to obtain a compromise.
In the Drafting Party the United States offered a new proposal which
took into consideration the language used in a number of bills of lading
for the carriage of live animals in United States export trade. This
proposal was endorsed by Belgium, Japan, U.K. and the U.S.S.R.
immediately and eventually by France and Norway. The proposal was
accepted by a 10 to 7 vote in the Working Group and is now incorporated
in Article 5(5) of the draft convention. 190
With respect to live animals, the carrier shall be relieved of his liability
where the loss, damage or delay in delivery results from any special risks
inherent in that kind of carriage. When the carrier proves that he has
complied with any special instructions given him by the shipper respecting
the animals and that, in the circumstances Qf the case, the loss, damage or
delay in delivery could be attributed to such risks, it shall be presumed that
the loss, damage or delay in delivery was so caused unless there is proof
that all or a part of the loss, damage or delay in delivery resulted from
fault or negligence on the part of the carrier, his servants or agents."
At the same time, a decision was taken to complete the definition of
goods so as to include live animals. It was believed that such a reference
was necessary in view of the long history of the exclusion of live animals
from coverage.
Art. 1(4)
"Goods" includes "goods, wares, merchandise and articles of every kind
whatsoever including live animals.
N. Definitions
(1) Definition of Carrier
The Working Group again considered the problems which arise when
the shipper contracts with one carrier (the "contracting carrier") and this
carrier arranges to have the goods carried by another carrier ("the actual
carrier"). General transshipment problems were also reconsidered. 19 '
However, the context of the discussion now also included the decisions
190 Report of the Sixth Session (fn. 170 supra) para. I l5(a)(l) and (2) at 44-45.
191 See Part II of this article, 7 J. Marit. L. & Comm. 340-346.
In this connection, an early draft proposed by Poland dealt extensively with these
questions.
Vol. 7, No. 4
taken by the Working Group Sixth Session with respect to the
"documentary" scope of the application of the Convention, since the
Hague Rules I(b) definition restricting contract of carriage only to
contracts of carriage covered by a "bill of lading or any similar
document of title . . . ", had been expanded by a provision that the
Convention shall be applicable to "all contracts for the carriage of goods
by sea." 192
A majority of delegates had approved the language used in the fifth
working session which placed responsibility on the initial carrier
("contracting carrier") and also on the "actual carrier" for the carriage
performed by him in transshipment situations. That majority also agreed
that the carrier with whom the shipper had made a contract of carriage
should remain the "contracting carrier" and should be responsible under
the Convention for the carriage to the port of destination despite bill of
lading clauses that the contract of carriage was only between the shipper
and the "actual carrier". Accordingly, it became necessary to have
careful definitions of the parties to a contract of carriage.
France proposed the following definition of carrier:
The carrier is the person or the enterprise which takes charge of particular
goods and undertakes to move them in order to direct them to their ports
of destination. It is that person or enterprise which issues in his or its name
the title document which serves as a receipt against handing over of the
goods.
The United Kingdom and Norway immediately disapproved of the
cumulative nature of the French proposal, noting that there could not be
more than one carrier at the same exact time.
DEFINITION OF THE CARRIER
Proposal by Poland
1. "Contracting Carrier" means any person or enterprise who, acting on his own behalf,
concludes with the shipper a contract for the carriage of goods.
2. "'Actual Carrier" means the ship's operator who effects the voyage in performing the
contract of carriage.
3. The term "Carrier" without any particular indication designates the contracting
carrier as well as the actual carrier.
4. Where the contracting carrier has not been named in the bill of lading [or any similar
document of title], it is assumed that the ship's operator is the contracting carrier as well.
Where in the bill of lading [or any similar document of title] made out in accordance with the
article [ ], the contracting carrier has been named inaccurately or falsely, the operator of
the vessel upon which the cargo has been loaded is liable to the consignee or cargo owner for
losses resulting therefrom; the ship's operator may have a recourse claim against the
contracting carrier.
Report of the Sixth Session (fn. 170, supra) para. 121 at 48.
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The United States said that that was the exact nature of the problem
of a single definition; one must not force the cargo interest to chase
phantom "carriers" when there were in fact many participants in the
movement of a single shipment. 193 Of course, cargo was not entitled to
double recovery, but the rights of the cargo interest must be made
interchangeable so that the cargo owner was certain of a recovery from
either an actual carrier or the contracting carrier. The United States
could agree with the following cumulative definition,
"Carrier" includes but is not limited to anyone who enters into a contract
of carriage with the shipper and anyone who undertakes to perform the
contract of carriage.
If the French cumulative formula were preferable, then it might be
193 In Mente & Co. v. Isthmian Steamship Co., 36 F.Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1940), aff'd. 122 F.2d
266 (2d Cir. 1941) the time charterer (as well as the shipowner) was bound by bills of lading signed
on its regular form after having solicited the cargo for the voyage. (See also Compagnie de
Navigation Fraissinet & Cyprien Fabre S.A. v. Mondial United Corp., 316 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1963);
Joseph L. Wilmotte & Co., Inc. v. Cobelfret Lines, S.A.R.L., 289 F.Supp. 601 (S.D. Fla. 1968).
Freight forwarders may or may not be considered as carriers depending on whether their
activities involve merely "arranging" or actually "effecting" the shipment. (See J. C. Penny Co. v.
American Express Co., 102 F.Supp. 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) aff'd 201 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1952).
Under United States law a person may be considered a common carrier by water even though he
does not own or operate the physical facilities of carriage. The Federal Maritime Commission
recognizes that an ocean forwarder or other person may become a non-vessel operating common
carrier by water (NVO) when he (a) holds himself out to provide transportation for hire by water in
foreign commerce; (b) assumes responsibility or has liability imposed by law for the safe
transportation of shipments; and (c) arranges in his own name with an underlying water carrier for
the performance of such transportation. Common Carriers by Water-Status of Express
Companies, Etc., 6 F.M.C. 245 (1961).
Under this doctrine, a forwarder may serve as a water carrier if he goes beyond arranging the
details of transportation .and actually assumes responsibility for the safe transportation of the goods.
(See J. C. Penny Co. v. American Express Co., supra.) The forwarder would become an NVO by
filing his tariff as a carrier with the Federal Maritime Commission (See generally, G. Ullman, The
Ocean Freight Forwarder, The Exporter and The Law (1967)). While a forwarder (or any other
person) as an NVO can offer service as an ocean carrier from a U.S. port to an overseas destination,
he cannot at the present time issue a through bill of lading from an interior U.S. point to a foreign
port (See, Ullman, The Role of The American Freight Forwarder in Intermodal, Containerized
Transportation, 2 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 625 (1971). Whether an NVO will be
permitted to enter into joint-rate agreements with land carriers for a through movement depended
on the outcome of a complex controversy between the F.M.C. and I.C.C., reflected in a proceeding
before the Interstate Commerce Commission. See Ex Parte 261, Tariffs Containing Joint Rules,
Etc., 337 I.C.C. 625; 341 I.C.C. 246; Port Royal Marine Corp. v. United States, 378 F.Supp. 345
(S.D. Ga. 1974), aff'd. 402 U.S. 901 (1975). Congress resolved the controversy clarifying the law in
favor of the F.M.C., 46 U.S.C. 804, as amended by P.L. 93-605.
The "demise clause," denounced because of the possibility that the shipper would have no rights
against the charterer who issued the bill of lading and no rights against the shipowner who was not
formally the carrier, has not caused major problems to cargo owners in the United States since the
courts have refused to give it effect as against H.R. 111(8). COGSA §1303(8) forbidding clauses in
the bill of lading which lessen the liability of the carrier. See Epstein v. United States, 86 F. Supp.
740 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
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acceptable to combine the concepts of bill of lading issuer with receiver
of cargo (taking in charge) and alternating these concepts with the
performance of the actual carriage, thus, a formula based on the French
proposal might be framed, as follows,
"Carrier" is anyone who takes charge of particular goods, and issues in his
name a document of title or receipt for the goods, and who undertakes to
move the goods to the port of destination, or who performs the contract of
carriage."
It soon became apparent that it would not be possible to solve
transshipment problems through the definitional article, accordingly the
Drafting Party sought solutions which would give rise to the maximum
amount of support because of vagueness. The full meaning of the
expression "in his own name" was not considered, and would cause
problems at later sessions.
The Drafting Party proposed the following definitions which were
approved:194
"1. "Carrier" or "contracting carrier" means any person who in his own
name enters into a contract of carriage o]'goods by sea with the shipper.
"2. "Actual carrier" means any person to whom the contracting carrier
has entrusted the performance of all or part of the carriage of goods."
(2) Definition of Ship
Most delegations felt that a definition of "ship" would no longer be
necessary because of the suggested revision of Article 1(d), extending
application of the Convention to the "period during which the goods are
in the charge of the carrier."19 This change should resolve also the
uncertainties which had arisen under the 1924 Convention as to whether
the Convention applies to barge or lightering operations carried on by
the carrier under the contract of carriage. It was therefore decided to
place square brackets around the present definition of "ship" in Article
I(d) and to defer decision in the matter to another session, when it was
deleted.
(3) Definition of Goods
The definition of "goods" was a policy matter considered at the third,
fifth, sixth and seventh sessions wherein the definitions of Article I of the
194 Id. para. 133(a)(1) and (2) at 52.
"'See Part I of this article, 7 J. Mar. L. & Comm. 77-84.
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Hague Rules (which excluded deck cargo and live animals) were
modified into the new Article 9 treatment of deck cargo and the new
article 5 treatment of live animals. 196
(4) Definition of Contract of Carriage
During the heated debates on the bill of lading definition, the subject
of defining the contract of carriage was also attempted. At one point the
only agreement was to define it in the following way, "Contract of
carriage means a contract of carriage." However, when it became
apparent that the debate on the definition of carrier and actual carrier
could not resolve the policy questions raised by transshipment, it was
proposed to use some of the language which had been proposed as part of
the definition of carrier to define the nature of the contract of carriage.197
5. "Contract of carriage" means a contract whereby the carrier agrees
with the shipper to carry by sea against payment of freight, specified goods
from one port to another where the goods are to be delivered.
(5) Definition of bill of lading
Article 3 of the Hague Rules (46 USC 1303(3)) deals with the contents
of the bill of lading without defining it, since in fact the basic
presumption of the Hague Rules was that the Convention would deal
with carriage of goods by sea only through the medium of the bill of
lading. The Fourth Report of the Secretary General' 98 assumed that a
more precise definition would be necessary in view of the likely
expansion of the Convention to documents other than bills of lading,
accordingly the Report proposed two alternative definitions: A-1, a very
specific and inclusionary definition, and A-2 a very broad definition.
Draft Provision A-1
"Bill of lading" means a document which evidences [the receipt of goods
and] a contract for their carriage and by which a carrier undertakes to
"'See fn. 190, supra.
4. "Goods" means any kind of goods, including live animals; where the goods are
consolidated in a container, pallet or similar article of transport or where they are packed,
"goods" includes such article of transport or packaging if supplied by the shipper.
197 Report of the Seventh Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/96 of 18 November 1974, paras. 99-103
at 33.
"I Report of the Secretary General, Fourth Report on Responsibility of Ocean Carriers for
Cargo: Bills of Lading (U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP. 17 (Vols. I and II) of 13 August 1974),
paras. 4-13 at 8-12.
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deliver the goods only to a person in possession of the document. A
provision in the document that the goods are to be delivered to the order of
a named person, or to bearer, constitutes such an undertaking.
Draft Provision A-2
"Bill of lading" means a document which evidences [the receipt of goods
and] a contract for [their] carriage and by which a carrier undertakes to
deliver the goods to the order [or assigns] of a named person or to bearer.
India began the debate with a demand for certainty to protect the
small shipper, and for that reason insisted that only bills of lading with
well-known mandatory contents should be given effect.
Norway described the bill of lading as a negotiable type of document
for carriage by sea, all other documents having the main function of
evidencing the goods in question-a document of presentation which
must be surrendered to obtain the goods. A second essential of the bill of
lading is that the person claiming under it must appear to be the due
holder. Article A-I did not adequately cover this point; merely stating
the necessity of a showing of entitlement to claim the goods. Neverthe-
less, although it was unnecessary to include a specific reference to
negotiability, there should be a statement that the document had to be
surrendered and, if the claimant was not the original consignee, there
must be appropriate endorsements.
India then proposed that there be a short definition, and then coverage
of the legal effects of the bill. Argentina supported India with respect to
the certainty of the bill of lading, with mandatory contents, and then
noted that goods are sometimes delivered to customs officials, who effect
actual delivery to consignees on receipt of the bill.
Singapore suggested that A-1 be changed to allow for cases where the
bill was surrendered to take possession of the goods,-the normal
practice, thus it would not be necessary for the customs problem to be
included in the convention. Since customarily several origilial copies are
issued, the question arises as to which copy is to be negotiable. It is
unwise to state that the goods had to be delivered against surrender of the
bill-the matter should be left to commercial practice.
Germany noted that a definition might prove to be too difficult at this
time and that perhaps it would be best for a simple definition to make
references to later substantive provisions.
France, then introduced the following definition, adopted from Draft
Proposal A-2.
"Bill of lading" means a document which proves the existence of a con-
tract for the carriage of goods by sea and which records the taking over of
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those goods by the carrier and his undertaking to deliver them, against
surrender of this document, to the order of a named person, or to that per-
son's assigns by way of endorsement, or to bearer.
The French proposal was endorsed by the United States with a caution
to those who would force the maritime industry to use complex bills of
lading. Such provisions would be an unnecessary hindrance to com-
merce, and where both shipper and carrier are satisfied that a bill of
lading is unnecessary, it would be a commercial mistake leading to
inefficiency and waste to force the use of the bill of, lading under all
circumstances.
The United States view with respect to the option of the parties was
immediately opposed by India and Argentina, demanding greater
certainty for small shippers and consignees against the carrier interest,
although endorsing Draft Proposal A-2.
The Chairman then summarized what he felt to be the key feature of
the definition: negotiability, surrender of goods on presentation, appear-
ance of legitimate status as holder. Accordingly he believed that an
amended version of A-1 could be referred to the Drafting Group. This
discussion appeared to eliminate the so-called "Straight" or non-nego-
tiable bill of lading which was not widely used in international trade.
Preservation of the straight bill, however, will be effected under Article
18 of the draft convention. The following definition of bill of lading for
the purposes of this Convention was approved:
6. "Bill of lading" means a document which evidences a contract for
the carriage of goods by sea and the taking over or loading of the goods by
the carrier, and by which the carrier undertakes to deliver the goods
against surrender of the document. A provision in the document that the
goods are to be delivered to the order of a named person, or to order, or to
bearer, constitutes such an undertaking.
(6) Definition of Consignee
There was general agreement, with the exception of France, on the
definition of consignee. France proposed to substiiute "l'ayant droit",
that is the person having the right to the goods. After an extensive de-
bate at the eighth session there was no support for the French proposal
and the traditional definition was adapted, as follows:
3. "Consignee" means the person entitled to take delivery of the goods.
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0. Contents and Legal Effects of the Bill of Lading and
Other Documents Evidencing the Contract of Carriage.
(1) Contents of the Bill of Lading
The Hague Rules provisions respecting mandatory contents, without
preventing the addition of other information, is found in Article
3(3)(a)(b) and (c). The only mandatory provisions were notations of:
a-leading marks
b-number of packages... or quantity, or weight... furnished in writing
by the shipper
c-the apparent order and condition of the goods.
The Secretary General's Report contained Draft Provisions B, C, D, E,
F, G and a list of 9 additional items of required information making a
total of 15 items of mandatory information for the bill of lading. 99
At the start of the debate the United States noted that the existing
provision was satisfactory and should not be changed. It was the private
view of the U.S. Delegation that the way in which the Report of the
Secretary General listed the items of information contributed to the
stampede effect which caused the new draft to contain fourteen manda-
tory provisions. 200
Norway proposed the simplification of 3(3)a of the existing Hague
Rules.
The Chairman then proposed to consider each item in the existing
provision and then discuss each of the proposed additions to the text.
First the Chairman asked whether §3(3)(b) of the Brussels Convention be
altered to read "and" instead of "or"? "And" would mean that the
number of packages and weight must be listed in the bill of lading. Of
course, such a provision would be required if the unit limitation of
liability (Article 6) were to be fixed solely by weight.
France, supported by O.C.T.I., said that quantity is too imprecise, a
very general concept. Perhaps "volume" was more appropriate.
Argentina supported "and". Both listings should be required. Also,
there should be an obligation to include a brief description of the goods,
as is normally done in practice any way. This was supported by India and
Chile.
Japan opposed "and", preferring "or". Japan agreed with the United
States that the existing provisions in the Hague Rules were satisfactory.
99 Id, paras. 25-52 at 14-25.
0 Report of the Secretary General (fn. 198 supra), paras. 51-2 at 23-5.
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Singapore said that a prospective purchaser of a bill of lading requires
it to contain as much information as possible, therefore the nature of the
goods should be specified in the bill of lading. France, however, said that
any description of the goods would have to be very general, since such
particularity would be impossible in containerized transport and might
even be harmful.
The Chairman summarized and said the bill must include the weight
and should include a description of the goods as far as possible, referring
the matter to the Drafting Party.
Thereafter there was a considerable debate about "packaging":
whether there is or should be a cause of action for damages to packaging
where there was no damage to cargo. This debate was set off by the man-
datory statement of the apparent order and condition of the goods.201
Germany argued that as to §3(c), the term "goods" in the Hague
Rules clearly included packaging, and therefore Draft Provision D should
be added to the Convention along with Draft Provision C. The nature of
the goods should be stated, but a carrier should be allowed to enter a
reservation to the effect that it is unable to make an assessment of the
quality of the goods. A vague descriptive term such as "general
merchandise", however, would not be appropriate in a bill of lading.
The USSR preferred the existing provisions, however Draft provision
C might be acceptable-a container might in fact belong to the shipper.
Draft provision D would involve a major expansion and would not be
desirable.
Singapore said the phrase "apparent order and condition of the
goods" was time-honored and should be retained. There was no existing
provision requiring the carrier to state visibility conditions (e.g.,
floodlights) at the time of loading. There was now no requirement that a
carrier examine the goods. Examination should also include smelling
them. It should also be made clear for containers whether the carrier
should be required to state the condition of the individual packages or the
exterior of the containers. Draft Provision C was preferable, although
Draft Provision D would be acceptable also.
Norway noted its agreement with Germany that the condition of the
packaging at the time of loading was important. If damaged, it was likely
20 Hague Rules, Art. 3 (3)(c),
"After receiving the goods into his charge, the carrier or the master or agent of the carrier
shall, on demand of the shipper, issue to the shipper a bill of lading showing among other
things:
(c) The apparent order and condition of the goods.
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that the goods were damaged also, and the carrier would be liable for
damage to packaging and the cost of repacking. As a result, draft
provision D was preferable. This was supported by France.
Japan opposed Draft Provision D. The addition of the words "all
packaging" to the end of Draft C was preferable, otherwise, reference to
packaging independently might create the dangerous interpretation that
there was a new cause of action for damage to packaging. Poland agreed
with Japan.
The I.C.S. stated that the original wording should not be changed
unnecessarily. The packaging inspection would force carriers to make
much more careful study and inspection of goods, thereby slowing down
maritime transport, which would benefit no one.
Argentina said Draft Provision C was preferable, Provision D was not
sound, since it was not in the interests of carriers or shippers to equate a
container with the goods, and unsatisfactory interpretation might result.
The Philippines said "C" is preferable to having a broad definition of
the word "goods", but "C" and "D" were not mutually exclusive.
The United States disapproved Draft Provision D as unnecessary.
There was not now a rash of cases where shippers were suing for damages
to packaging when there was no damage to the cargo itself. Undoubt-
edly, under the present rules there could be recovery for damage to cargo
and packaging, but it would be a mistake to "spot-light" a possible cause
of action for damage to packaging alone. It might be a monster which
would be regretted for practical reasons, despite the theoretical symme-
. try from Draft D. If a choice had to be made, C was preferable. An
attempt was then made to describe actual operations on the dock when
goods are shipped and the bill of lading, prepared by shippers, was
issued. The United States pointed out that much of the dissatisfaction
with the present 3(3)(c) had to do with the practice of banks regarding
documentary letters of credit, something which this Working Group
could do nothing about. Rule 16 of the 1962 ICC Uniform Customs &
Practices summarized the case law on the distinctions between clean and
foul bills of lading, but the temptation to carriers to declare all shipments
in bad condition, thereby fouling the bills of lading, had not happened in
fact because shipping remained a very competitive industry.
India desired a clause incorporating both C and D. Chile and Nigeria
agreed.
Singapore noted that the quality of the packaging is important to third
parties. Bill of lading holders must be able to establish where packaging
damage occurred, and the carrier should be prevented from disclaiming
liability.
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The I.U.M.I. said that few cargo policy claims were now made for
packaging damage alone; generally only for containers. In that respect,
"C" would normally be taken to mean packaging of little value, while
"D" expressly referred to containers and crates. Furthermore, "C" deals
only with the formality of entering information on the bill of lading,
while "D" extended the scope of the general responsibility of the carrier
by equating packaging with goods.
The C.M.I. agreed with the U.S. that any problems in describing
goods arose from the role of clean bills of lading in documentary letters
of credit. Draft "C" might induce carriers to add unnecessary reserva-
tions on bills of lading while Draft "D" would not have that effect, as it
merely extended the definition of goods. Chile also feared that "C"
would induce unclean bills. Would the carriers liability be limited if he
did state that the packaging was not in good order? He was not sure.
The United Kingdom stated Draft "C" was acceptable. Draft "D"
was not, if it meant that the carrier must insure that the packaging also
arrived in good condition. Cases where the packaging itself was of value
and intended for re-use are covered in provisions already considered.
Argentina agreed that "D" would make the carrier liable for damage to
packaging.
Norway believed "D" would not create a new cause of action. The
claims would still have to be brought under national law; its purpose
being to bring all liability problems under one set of rules. Also, such
claims are presently made anyway.
Germany was in favor of "D", believing it would not lead to
unjustified claims. Nevertheless, it would be wise to specify that the
provision did not apply to deterioration in the normal course of handling,
even though the definition of damage would perhaps render this unneces-
sary.
The United States agreed that uniform rules were necessary, and that
claims for damages to packaging were presently allowed, nevertheless it
would seem to be an abuse of the new rules if there would now be claims
for damage to packaging alone. If "D" were used, the unit limitation of
liability would give adequate protection against de minimis claims, but,
if further protection against abuse was desired, the unit limitation could
be lowered for damage to packaging-leaving three levels: packaging,
delay and ordinary damage in the Unit Limitation Provisions. This,
however, would be a burdensome complication of the text.
The I.C.C. noted that in requiring the condition of the packaging to be
mentioned, the text might make it absolutely clear to banks that the
comment referred only tO packaging and not the goods. However, it
would remain uncertain how the banks might interpret this.
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Because no consensus was apparent the Chairman took an indicative
vote, as follows:
N o change in §3(3)(c) ......................................... 8
"C " ............................ ........................ . 9
"D " ........................................................ 7
Both "C" & "D" ................ .................. 8
One provision combining "C" & "D". ........................... 1
Belgium observed that the question of the mandatory contents of the
bill and the legal effect of the insertion or omission of reference to the
condition of the goods should be clearly separated from the question of
carrier liability for packaging. Accordingly, the Working Group's text
reflected Draft Proposal "C" in the definition of goods.
Then Norway began the discussion of the lists of proposed mandatory
inclusions. Any of the alternatives would be acceptable because the
crucial issue was the kind of reservations which the carrier would make.
For example, in addition to the apparent order and condition of the
goods, the carrier must also mention packaging damage, defects and
insufficiency under Norwegian law-that is, a duty to make statements
on the bill of lading as to those subjects.
Germany, with the concurrence of Norway & U.K. said that informa-
tion on the nature and apparent order and condition of the goods should
be required.
France felt the name and principal place of business of the carrier, or
actual carrier but not the "contracting carrier," should be required.
Norway disagreed in view of the fact that the actual carrier is not known
at the time of issuance. Accordingly, only the name of the contracting
carrier should be required. The C.M.I. observer agreed the word
"contracting" should be retained if the contracting carrier was to be held
liable; otherwise he could merely insert the name of the actual carrier.
France noted that this problem would be solved by reference to the
definition of terms. The term "contracting carrier" only had a special
meaning when there was also an actual carrier.
France also felt the place of business would be valuable, because it
determined the applicability of the convention, however, the date of
issuance served no function; rather, the date on which the carrier took
charge of the goods would be more useful as it would establish the period
of carrier liability, and should be required. Chile and Norway agreed.
The French proposal was adopted by a vote of 10 in favor, 4 opposed,
2 abstentions.
At this point in the debate there was a diffuse discussion of added
mandatory provisions. Unfortunately, the Secretary General's Report
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lumped all the suggestions together, and many of the speakers assumed
that all of these were of equal importance. The Draft Provisions were:
Para. 50: "G"-The place and date of its issuance;
Para. 51: (i)-The ports of loading and discharge under the contract of
carriage;
(ii)-The name of the vessel on which the goods are loaded;
(iii)-Description of the nature of the goods covered by the bill
of lading;
(iv)-The signature of the carrier;
(v)-The freight charges on the shipment;
(vi)-The number of originals of the bill of lading;
(vii)-The name of the shipper;
(viii)-The name of the consignee;
(ix)-Detailed provisions as to negotiability;
India supported inclusion of all proposals but Negotiability Provisions
for mandatory contents.
Poland proposed an additional item: the duration or amount of the
vessel's demurrage or detention, since Polish law required that owners'
claim in respect of demurrage had to be based on indications in the bill of
lading.
Singapore supported all items, since they were in accord with com-
mercial practice. The ports of loading and discharge were necessary
for export/import licenses and consular formalities. The vessel's name
and the date of shipment were necessary to take out a marine policy.
Hungary agreed that (i) ports of loading and discharge were important
since they determined the applicability of the convention.
Germany believed that careful thought must be given to the effect of
non-inclusion of one of the items. There should not be a requirement of
detailed provisions regarding negotiability. In view of the use of
mechanical reproduction of signatures, the term "signature" should be
defined.
France favored mandatory inclusion of items (i)-(viii), but not (ix).
As to (iv) Carrier signature, he proposed the addition of the term "or his
agent". As to item (v) (Freight) he proposed the addition of, "or the
notation that freight has been prepaid". As to item (viii) (Name of
Consignee) he proposed the addition of, "except if the B/L is made out
to order or to the bearer". Respecting the effect of omission, he felt the
wisest course would be to leave to the competent court in each case to
decide whether the omission had caused any damage to the party
invoking the omission.
Norway noted that items (i) & (ii) were clearly appropriate for "on
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board" or "shipped" bills, but not for "received for shipment" bills. In
no case should invalidity result from the omission of any item. He
suggested that the provisions be worded to allow the shipper to request
the inclusion of the items, and obligate the carrier to comply with the
request. It would also be necessary to provide that the carrier could print
or stamp its signature. The notation of prepaid freight should be
required, but negotiability should not be discussed in this context.
Nigeria agreed with India. It was important that all items be required.
In Nigeria, importation from certain countries was prohibited and from
certain others was licensed, thus his country now required the informa-
tion on the port of loading. The number of originals might be left to
current trade practice, which varied, but only a "statement" as to
negotiability should be required. He would be satisfied by the stamping
of the word "negotiable" on the bill of lading.
Argentina argued that the omission of terms on the apparent condition
of the goods and the fact of freight due on arrival would be the equivalent
of notations that the goods were in apparent good order and that no
freight was due on arrival. The omitting carrier would be responsible
under Draft Provision C to the holder for any loss resulting in good faith
from that omission.
The United States opposed any further addition to the Hague Rules
list of required items. New mandatory provisions would be impediments
to commerce. Undoubtedly carriers would have no objection to including
whatever information the shipper desired, and the matter should be left
to agreement of the parties. The proposed items would be found on most
printed bills and did not require international regulation. Usually the bill
was typed up and prepared by the shipper, therefore the carrier ought not
to have the burden of insuring that all required information was con-
tained.
The proposed requirement of a signature would perpetuate a meaning-
less ritual. Furthermore, in view of the increasing use of electronic
data-processing equipment in the North-Atlantic trade now it would
present an impossible burden to commerce. The question of indicating
prepaid or collect freight might conveniently be left to national
legislation. As to item (vi) (Number of Originals), the purpose of more
than one original developed in the 1940's and 1950's in that one copy
would be sent by seamail and two copies by airmail. With the increasing
deterioration of the postal systems throughout the world, the goods often
arrived before any of the copies, thus the use of electronic data
processing became a practical necessity. Since the name of the consignee
might not be known at the time of shipment, it was an unnecessary
Hague Rules 64,1July 1976
642 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce
requirement. The notation "order" or "bearer" should be enough to
satisfy the negotiability requirement. He reiterated that none of the
proposed items (i)-(ix) should be made mandatory, although the
proposed uniform bill of lading of N.C.I.T.D. did contain most sugges-
tions.
Chile supported the mandatory inclusion of all additional items,
including a proviso as to prepaid freight, and the name of the consignee if
not a bearer bill, however, he concurred in the elimination of item (ix)
(Negotiability). Respecting the effect of omissions, the relative impor-
tance of each item and the effect on the burden of proof would have to be
determined for each of the contents by national courts. Perhaps bills of
lading without these mandatory contents could not be offered in court by
the Carrier.
India felt the signature was necessary to allow detection of stolen
documents. Also the notation of freight charges would lead to greater
confidence in the shipping world.
The U.S.S.R. felt the only item absolutely necessary was (i) the ports
of loading and discharge because these determined the application of the
convention. Items (ii)-(viii) should remain optional, because the effect of
their omission was uncertain and there was no reason why the carrier
would not include them. Belgium also objected to the provisions on
negotiability, freight, and name of consignee as impractical. Belgian law
forbade more than one original bill.
Tanzania felt the mandatory inclusions would not necessarily slow
down trade, and speed was not the only consideration. The system must
be accurate and must protect consignees more adequately. He strongly
supported item i, ii, vii and viii.
The I.U.M.I. noted that none of the items (i)-(viii) were necessary for
marine insurers, who based coverage on declarations of the insured. He
insisted that (iii) description of the goods, would be helpful only to
thieves.
The I.C.S. supported the U.S. position. Carriers had no objection to
voluntarily including such information at the request of the shipper.
Norway felt the legal effects of non-insertion should have no relation
to the validity of the bill of lading.
Ghana agreed that non-insertion should not result in invalidity noting,
however, that the items thought to be necessary by the developing
countries should be supported.
Discussion of a special provision for shipped bills of lading proved to
be unnecessary. There was general agreement that Draft Provision H
was better and simpler than Art. III (7) of the Hague Rules.
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To assist the drafting of the provisions on all the foregoing matters the
Chairman of the Drafting Group formulated a text on the Contents of
the Bill of Lading, as follows,
I. The bill of lading shall show:
(a) the general nature of the goods, the number of packages or pieces,
their marks and numbers, and the weight of the goods or their
quantity otherwise expressed, all such particulars as furnished by
the shipper; and
(b) the apparent order and condition of the goods.
2. The bill of lading shall also contain the following particulars:
(a) the name and principal place of business of the contracting carrier;
(b) the port of loading under the contract of carriage and the date on
which the goods were taken in charge by the carrier at the port of
loading;
(c) the port of discharge under the contract of carriage; and
(d) the number of originals of the bill of lading.
3. At the request of the shipper, the carrier shall include the following
particulars in the bill of lading:
(a) the freight; if applicable, a statement as regards prepaid freight;
(b) the name of the shipper;
(c) the name of the consignee.
4. (= draft provision H excluding "the port of loading")
5. The absence in the bill of lading of one or more particulars referred to
in this article shall not affect the validity of the contract of carriage
evidenced by bill of lading.
Thereafter the Drafting Group reworked this text. Reservations were
made concerning the problem of "packaging"; the preference for the
disjunctive "or" instead of the conjunctive "and" in the reformulation of
the existing mandatory contents provisions of the Hague Rules, and the
view of the U.S. delegation and Japan that there should be no additions
to the present text list of mandatory contents provisions. The phrase,
"among other things," was added to the first provision to meet the needs
of Poland respecting demurrage, by vote of 6 in favor, 4 against with 5
abstentions.
The text offered by the Drafting Group, approved by the Working
Group and now found in Article 15 of the draft Convention follows:
Contents of Bill of Lading
1. The bill of lading shall set forth (among other things) the following
particulars:
(a) the general nature of the goods, the leading marks necessary for
identification of the goods, the number of packages or pieces, and
the weight of the goods or their quantity otherwise expressed, all
such particulars as furnished by the shipper;
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(b) the apparent condition of the goods including their packaging;
(c) the name and principal place of business of the carrier;
(d) the name of the shipper;
(e) the consignee if named by the shipper;
(f) the port of loading under the contract of carriage and the date on
which the goods were taken over by the carrier at the port of
loading;
(g) the port of discharge under the contract of carriage;
(h) the number of originals of the bill of lading;
(i) the place of issuance of the bill of lading;
(j) the signature of the carrier or a person acting on his behalf; the
signature may be printed or stamped if the law of the country
where the bill of lading is issued so permits; and
(k) the freight to the extent payable by the consignee (or other
indication that freight is payable by him).
2. After the goods are loaded on board, if the shipper so demands, the
carrier shall issue to the shipper a "shipped" bill of lading which, in
addition to the particulars required under paragraph 1, shall state that
the goods are on board a named ship or ships, and the date or dates of
loading. If the carrier has previously issued to the shipper a bill of
lading or other document of title with respect to any of such goods, on
request of the carrier the shipper shall surrender such document in
exchange for the "shipped" bill of lading. The carrier may amend any
previously issued document in order to meet the shipper's demand for a
"shipped" bill of lading if, as amended, such document includes all the
information required to be contained in a "shipped" bill of lading.
3. The absence in the bill of lading of one or more particulars referred to
in this article shall not affect the validity of the bill of lading.
At the Closing Plenary France, supported by Belgium, Chile and
Argentina sought to remove the adjective "general" from the phrase
"nature of the goods" in the first sentence. It was decided that the French
and Spanish texts might be prepared without the word "general" but that
the expression was necessary in English and should be retained. Also
there was another debate about the requirement that "freight" be stated
in the bill of lading. Another attempt was made in the Plenary to delete
or modify the provision respecting Freight. Essentially the arguments
previously made were remade. During the lengthy discussion the
strongest proponents recognized that the exact computation of the
freight might not be known at the time of shipment and that there was no
need to delay the shipment for such a computation, accordingly, a
compromise solution was proposed whereby the phrase "or other
indication that freight is payable by him" would be added to the original
draft language "the freight to the extent payable by the consignee."
There was no objection to comments that "Freight Prepaid" or "Freight
Collect" notations on the bill of lading would comply with this provision.
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The vote on the amended language was 10 in favor, 7 opposed, no
abstentions.
At the Second Reading the United States offered a proposal on
signature in Subparagraph (0) of paragraph 1 of Article 15 to expand the
ways in which signatures can be affixed to documents. Concern had -been
expressed at meetings of the U.S. Study Group on Maritime Bills of
Lading that the old formulation of subparagraph (j) might not cover
modern methods of affixing signatures to bills of lading. At the request
of the U.S. delegation paragraph 1 (j) of Article 15 was amended to
make it compatible with such methods. The new text reads:
"The signature of the carrier or a person acting in his behalf; the
signature may be in handwriting, printed, in facsimile, perforated,
stamped, in symbols, or made by any other mechanical or electronic
means, if the law of the country where the bill of lading is issued so
permits."
An additional U.S. proposal was the addition of a new paragraph to
follow paragraph I to read as follows: "Any other means which would
preserve a record of the particulars set forth in paragraph I may, with the
consent of the shipper, serve as a bill of lading." The purpose of the
amendment was to make the convention compatible with electronic data
processing methods used or to be used in the future in connection with
transport documents. No representatives expressed the opinion that the
new convention would not be compatible with present or future develop-
ments with respect to electronic or automatic data processing of bills
of lading; however, some representatives stated that an amendment was
not needed to accomplish the desired result. Following this discussion
the Working Group decided not to adopt the U.S. proposal.
(2) Legal Effects of the Bill of Lading
Draft Provision E was an amendment to the general proviso of §3(3)
which now allows the carrier to omit from the bill certain types of
statements supplied by the shipper. "E"'s purpose was to bring the
convention into alignment with current commercial practice. Statements
would be included in the bill of lading, but the carrier would also include
reservations as to their accuracy. The debate now concentrated on the
problem of reservations.
France suggested that §36 of the French legislation be used as the
model. The carrier is not bound to insert particulars supplied by the
shipper, but must give exact reasons for not doing so. If he does not give
reasons, he cannot invoke limitation of liability or contest the shipper's
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claim. Argentina agreed with the French proposal. Singapore also
agreed with the French proposal, generally, but suggested a proviso that
the shipper should be deemed to have supplied accurate particulars to the
carrier. This proviso would limit the effect of a standard reservation
clause by the carrier and the carrier would be safeguarded by his right to
indemnification from the shipper for inaccurate statements. The I.C.C.
observer concurred with France and noted that this procedure had been
adopted by the I.C.C. Uniform Rules for Combined Transport.
Germany believed Draft Provision E was too narrow, and suggested
th4t the original wording be retained with the French provisions added
thereto. As a result, the carrier would not be found to insert shipper's
particulars, but if he did so, he would be free to enter a reservation.
Germany had no objections to a requirement that the carrier give reasons
for any reservations.
Norway noted that under the Uniform Customs and Practices on
Documentary Credits, only a specific reservation as to certain particu-
lars and not a general reservation made a bill unclean. The carrier should
not be allowed to enter a reservation regarding information he could
reasonably have verified by himself. Norway feared that a rule requiring
reasons for reservations would not go the heart of the matter and then
suggested that draft provision "E" should be adopted with the following
addition underlined:
"If a bill of lading contains particulars concerning the description,
marks, number, quantity or weight of the goods, which the carrier has
reasonable grounds for suspecting not accurately to represent the goods
actually received, or which he has not reasonable means of checking, the
carrier shall [state] [specify] such reservation in the bill of lading. Where
the carrier has stated a reservation as regards particulars concerning the
goods, such reservation[cannot be invoked] [shall be invalid] as against a
third party acting in good faith if the carrier knew or ought to have known
that such particulars were inaccurate and the reservation does not
expressly refer to such inaccuracy."
The carrier should take reasonable steps to insure the accuracy of
information on the bill of lading under the present convention, thus, the
carrier should delete information when he was not in a position to check
on it. This is not in keeping with commercial practice, since the
unverified information was still needed. Commercial practice was to
enter a reservation concerning the doubtful information, which was the
substance of Draft Proposal E. Nevertheless, the carrier should be
required to give reasons for any reservation. Under Norwegian law, a
general reservation was insufficient where the carrier knew, or should
have known of an inaccuracy.
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France felt the Norwegian addition would be an improvement, but
French law was preferable because more precise. Under French law,
where the carrier had serious doubts concerning information supplied by
the shipper, he could refuse to insert such information, but had to give
reasons for doing so. This had worked well in practice. France then
proposed a text, adopted from the French legislation.
"(1) If the bill of lading contains particulars concerning the nature,
leading marks, number of packages or pieces, weight or quantity of the
goods which the carrier has substantial reasons to suspect not to represent
accurately the goods which he has actually taken over, or if he had no
reasonable means of verifying such particulars, the carrier shall make
special note giving reasons for such impossibility of verification.
(2) In the absence of reservation permitted under the para. 1, the bill of
lading shall be pritna facie evidence that the carrier has taken over the
goods as they were described in the bill of lading.
(3) However, proof to the contrary shall not be admitted when the bill of
lading was transferred to a third party holder acting in good faith.
(4) Those particulars in the bill of lading which are the subject of
reservations permitted under para. 1 do not enjoy the benefit of the
presumptions provided for in para. 2."
The C.M.I. observer felt the situation was closely related to unit
limitation of liability. Under Alternative "B" (Article 6),2o2 goods
packed in a container had to be enumerated to constitute separate
shipping units. If the carrier refused to insert the information on
contents, the unit limitation of liability would apply to the container as a
whole. The INSA observer said the French proposal would create serious
difficulties for arbitration courts by creating a complicated bi-level
system of proof. Normally the shipper has the burden of proving that the
information contained in a bill of lading is accurate, but the French
proposal to require a carrier to set forth reasons for any reservation
might lead to standard reservations to which standard objections would
be made, pure formalism, thereby forcing the shipper to prove that the
carrier's reasons were inadequate.
Germany disagreed with INSA, but felt that the last sentence of the
French proposal did not seem to be accurate. Under the Hague Rules,
the shipper always had the burden of proving damage to the goods, and
there was danger that the French proposal might in some way affect this
presumption, therefore the following language was suggested as an
addition: "In case of such reservation, it is for the shipper to prove that,
despite the reservation, the carrier had received the goods in the quantity
202 For Article 6, Alternative B, see the Second Part of this article, fn. 114, 7 J. Mar. L. & Comm.
334.
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and state described." Germany felt strongly that the shipper should not
be able to invoke the presumption of delivery in sound condition.
France replied that the last sentence reversed the normal presumption
of liability in some circumstances. The burden of proof is on the shipper,
of course, to show that some material damage has occurred, but once
that is done the carrier is automatically presumed liable. Under French
law, the presumption does not apply where the carrier entered a reserva-
tion upon suspect information and gave his reasons.
The O.C.T.I. representative suggested that it might be useful to
specify who is legally responsible for completing the bill of lading. Also,
the point raised by CMI was valid. Where the goods were delivered in
poor condition, the shipper had to show that the goods were handed over
to the carrier in good condition. Under French case law, the absence of
any notation on the bill established an absolute presumption that the
goods were delivered in good condition. Under German case law,
obvious damage placed the burden of proof on the carrier, while damage
that was not obvious placed the burden on the shipper.
Chile said that the Brussels convention had created two periods of
responsibility-the first when the shipper guaranteed the accuracy of the
information in the bill; the second when the carrier accepted responsibili-
ty on the basis of the document he received. Under consideration now
was the question when the carrier was entitled to express a reservation
altering the presumption of liability. The Norwegian proposal was much
too wide and the French proposal was preferable, but the last sentence
seemed irrelevant. A reservation does not affect the question of proof of
damage because there are other ways of proving the condition of goods
at the moment of handing over. Singapore concurred and noted its
approval of the French proposal also. Singapore felt that the French
requirement of "serious reasons" offered adequate protection against a
carrier's possible abuse of the right to make notations on the bill of
lading. However, the last sentence seemed unnecessary, since, if the
information was not inserted, it did not constitute prima facie evidence.
It was inappropriate to require the carrier to state the apparent condition
of the goods and thereby provide the consignee (who has the burden of
proof) with prima facie evidence. The French proposal was supported in
its entirety, since the requirement of a statement of reasons is to protect
the consignee, whose only source of information is the bill of lading.
Argentina believed the question as to who was responsible for preparing
the bill was irrelevant since the carrier's signature was the event that gave
legal effect to the bill of lading.
Belgium did not agree. Draft provision E was favored as a reflection of
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existing commercial practice, while the Norwegian proposal would also
be acceptable. Belgium had misgivings about the last sentence of the
French proposal. Under Belgian law, both bill of lading statements and
carrier reservations were taken into account equally in assessing the
carrier's liability. The requirement that the carrier must state reasons for
suspicion or impossibility of checking would impose an unduly heavy
burden on the carrier and slow up operations.
France again insisted on the adoption of his proposal. The French
statute had been enacted to combat an abuse in the Hague Rules by
which "general reservations" had become standard clauses for carrier
exoneration of liability. While the Norwegian proposal represented an
improvement over Draft E, it only protected a third party, not the
shipper or consignee, whereas the essential feature of the French
proposal was the required statement of reasons which would protect the
cargo interest.
Draft Proposal E was then defended on the ground that commercial
practice had diverged from the Hague Rules; the latter permitted the
omission of information, but this was not followed in practice because of
bank letter of credit usage. The bank needed the information, even if it
was unverified. To reconcile practice and law, therefore, Draft "E" did
not permit omission, but allowed more specific reservations to be made.
The Norwegian proposal was an improvement on E. In sealed container
shipments, the shipper's description was checked very rapidly by the
carrier. The French proposal did not deal with the description of the
goods, it dealt only with the limited "marks, number, quantity, weight or
condition" of the Hague Rules. The big question was how to deal with
goods shipped in a container. The Draft "E" answer conformed with
practice in that specified reservations, rather than omissions, were
allowed.
Japan said that in view of commercial practice with regard to issuance
of letters of credit, the French proposal was impracticable, and Draft
provision E was better. Japan questioned the Norwegian proposal-what
if the carrier knew of an inaccuracy but had no way of determining the
true facts-e.g., incorrect weight being apparent-How would that be
reflected in the Bill of Lading?
The United States noted that there were no irreconcilable differences
in the proposals and that there were valuable elements in each, but that
the important elements had been mixed together in the discussion. For
that reason the United States offered a Proposal, redrafting and
combining Draft Proposal E, the Norwegian amendment and the French
legislation.
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Amendments to Draft Proposal E proposed by the United States
(1) The carrier or his agent may refuse to insert in the bill of lading
declarations proposed by the shipper concerning the marks, number,
quantity, weight or apparent order and condition of the goods and their
packaging, provided that the carrier has reasons for suspecting the
accuracy of such declarations or if there are no reasonable means of
determining the facts.
(2) The carrier who refuses such shipper declarations [in accordance
with sec. 1 supral may insert the declarations proposed by the shipper
together with his declaration (or reservation) concerning the goods which
states his specific suspicions of the accuracy of the declarations or the
reasons why it was impossible to determine the facts.
(3) Carrier declarations (or reservations) made in accordance with sec. 2
supra shall be invalid against a third party who has purchased the bill of
lading in good faith and without knowledge of the reservations.
The United States argued that any provision to be adopted should reflect
existing commercial practice where there is divergence from existing law.
Thus, notations by the carrier showing differences in the cargo from the
description prepared by the shipper were used, but the law must indicate
that such reservations should not be made lightly. They should not
constitute exoneration from a whole category of future claims. Lastly it
is essential that good faith purchasers of the bill of lading be protected
against possible fraud.2" 3
203 In accordance with COGSA 1303 (3); H.R. III (3), the carrier or the master or agent of the
carrier, on the shipper's demand, shall issue a bill of lading showing: Leading marks as furnished by
the shipper before loading; the number of packages or the number of pieces or the quantity of
cargo received or the weight of the cargo received, as furnished by the shipper; the apparent order
and condition of the goods. By the terms of COGSA 1304 (5), the shipper may also declare the na-
ture and value of the goods before shipment and insert same in the bill of lading; there being cus-
tomarily an additional fee for such a bill of lading. Furthermore COGSA 1310 concerning bulk
cargoes provides that when the weight of the bulk cargo has been ascertained by a weigher other
than the carrier or shipper and is stated in the bill of lading, such weight will not be prima facie
evidence against the carrier as to the received weight.
In addition to the COGSA requirements, the Pomerene Bills of Lading Act, applicable to bills of
lading issued in the United States, requires that the carrier who has loaded cargo count the number
of packages shipped, and to ascertain the kind and quantity of bulk cargo (49 U.S.C. 100). However,
where the shipper has loaded the cargo, for example, in cases of bulk cargo, the endorsement
indicating shipper's weight, lodd and count may validly be inserted by the carrier in the bill (49
U.S.C. 101).
The carrier's duty to account precisely for the goods described in the bill is strengthened by the
provisions of the Pomerene Act (49 U.S.C. 102) which prevents (or estops) the carrier from denying
the accuracy of the description in the bill of lading after it has been negotiated. The statute says the
carrier shall be liable to " ... (a) the owner of goods covered by a straight bill of lading subject to
existing right of stoppage in transitu or (b) the holder of an order bill, who has given value in good
faith, relying upon the description therein of the goods, or upon the shipment being made upon the
date therein, for damages caused by the non-receipt by the carrier of all or part of the goods upon or
prior to the date therein shown, or their failure to correspond with the description thereof in the bill
of lading at its issue."
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Norway again disapproved the French Proposal which would give the
carrier the right to refuse to insert particulars. Such refusal would make
the bill of lading unusable. The shipper would not be able to get credit
from a bank. The basic purpose of any provision should be to protect a
buyer of the bill of lading: to give him accurate information, thus the
shipper should guarantee the information on the bill. It was the duty of
the carrier to disclose inaccurate shipper information. The general
reservation, which created the most problems, should not protect the
carrier as against a holder of the bill of lading if the carrier knew or
ought to have known the true condition of the goods; such provision
being a better protection than a statement of reasons. To answer the
Japanese question,-it was the carrier's duty to indicate such an anomaly
on the bill of lading.
The I.U.M.I. observer said marine insurers would support any
proposal which tended to reduce the effect of general reservations and
ensure the accuracy of the contents of the bill. Draft "E" was a better
approach. He feared the last sentence of the French proposal was so
general in terms that it would lead to difficulties, and the term "ought to
COGSA 1303 (3) (c) has a proviso not found in H.R. III (3) that the carrier is not bound to state
any marks, number, quantity or weight which he has no reasonable means of checking or which he
has reasonable grounds to suspect may not actually represent the goods received. Furthermore,
COGSA 1303 (5); H.R. III (5) contains the shipper's guarantee of the accuracy of the marks,
number, quantity, and weights as furnished by the shipper. COGSA 1303 (4) provides that the bill
shall be prima facie evidence of the receipt by the carrier of goods as therein described . . . " and
H.R. III (4) provides substantially the same thing, "Un tel conaissement vaudra pr6somption, sauf
preuve contraire, de la reception par le transporteur des marchandises telles qu' elles y sont
descrites. . . " Thus, the carrier is not absolutely liable for the shipper's description of the goods.
The Pomerene Act, however, obligates a carrier who loads cargo to count the number of packages
shipped and to ascertain the kind and quantity of bulk cargo, nevertheless, if the cargo is actually
loaded by the shipper the carrier may endorse the bill of lading to indicate, "Shipper's weight, load
and count." If the shipper of bulk cargo maintains adequate facilities for weighing which are
available to the carrier, the carrier must ascertain the kind and quantity of bulk cargo shipped, upon
shipper's request and upon being given a reasonable opportunity to do so. In addition to the prima
facie liability for shipper's description referred to in COGSA 1303 (4), it will be necessary to refer to
the language of the Pomerene Act (49 U.S.C. 102), applicable to bills of lading issued in the United
States, which will estop the carrier from denying the accuracy of the bill of lading description, thus
the description of the goods becomes conclusive as to carrier liability on negotiated bills. See,
generally, Mamiye Bros. v. Barber Steamship Lines Inc. 360 F2d. 774 (2nd Cir. 1966) cert. denied
385 U.S. 835 (1967); Commodity Service Corp. v. Hamburg America Line 354 F2d. 234 (2nd. Cir.
1965); Portland Fish Co. v. States S.S. Co., 1975 A.M.C. 392.
COGSA 1310 adds a provision concerning the weight of bulk cargoes, as follows:
"Where under the customs of any trade the weight of any bulk cargo inserted in the bill of
lading is a weight ascertained or accepted by a third party other than the carrier or shipper
and the fact that the weight is so ascertained or accepted is stated in the bill of lading, then,
notwithstanding anything in this chapter, the bill of lading shall not be deemed to be prima
facie evidence against the carrier of the receipt of goods of the weight so inserted in the bill of
lading, and the accuracy thereof at the time of shipment shall not be deemed to have been
guaranteed by the shipper."
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have known" in the Norwegian proposal would create considerable proof
difficulties for shippers and consignees. Finally, he believed that the
United States proposal was very close to commercial practice and could
be approved.
Singapore felt that bank letter of credit practice was very flexible,
therefore it should not greatly influence the drafting. Since the Norwe-
gian proposal would impose on the consignee the burden of proof
regarding the condition of the goods at the time of shipment it was not
desirable.
France argued again that this proposal did not exclude the description
of the goods under §3(3) of the Hague Rules, and in view of criticisms a
new last sentence was proposed: "The burden of proof as to the condition
of the goods at the time of their being taken by the carrier into his charge
shall then be borne by the shipper or consignee."
Chile changed its position and now preferred Draft E, believing that
the carrier should include the information, although entitled to note that
the information was suspect or uncheckable. Chile continued to agree
with France that reasons for a reservation should be given, and
therefore proposed the following amendment to E. "If a B/L contains
particulars concerning the description, marks, number, quantity or
weight of the goods which the carrier has reasonable grounds for
suspecting not accurately to represent the goods actually received or
when he has no reasonable means of checking, the carrier shall specify
such reservation in the bill of lading indicating the reasons for his
decision or the reasons that had prevented him from checking the
goods."
The C.M.I. observer said that due to the uses made of the numerous
copies of bills of lading it was not practical to limit or delete much of the
information currently included. An E.C.E. Committee was currently
working to develop the "Liner Waybill"-a nonnegotiable and simpli-
fied alternative to the bill of lading which had already proved successful
in Transatlantic container transportation. He supported the French
proposal somewhat facetiously because it would lead to the eventual
disappearance of the bill of lading; shippers would no longer ask for it
since carriers might impose extra charges for its use. Only if the
requirements of bills of lading were made flexible could they sur-
vive-especially so if only authenticated information could be used.
The O.C.T.I. representative said four questions must be answered in
this debate, and the Chairman then took an indicative "cascade" of votes
on the four propositions, as follows:
A-Is the carrier obliged to include in the bill of lading all statements
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furnished by the shipper-description, marks, number, quantity and
weight of the goods? The vote was 13 yes; 0 no; 1 abstains.
B-May the carrier add his reservations to the statements furnished by the
shipper which are to be included in the bill of lading? The vote was 14
yes; 0 no.
C-(1) Must the carrier give a specific mention of the fact on which he
bases his reservations? The vote was 15 yes; 0 no; 1 abstains.
(2) Must he also give specific reasons for his reservations? The vote
was 10 yes; 4 no; I abstains.
D-Must there be a special rule on the legal effects of reservation made by
the carrier on the bill of lading? The vote was 6 yes; 9 no; 2 abstain.
The debate then moved to a discussion of the evidentiary effect of the
bill of lading with the interlocking question of the effects of carrier
reservations to shipper supplied information and whether any special
provision should be made for cargoes shipped in bulk as opposed to
containerized shipments or cargoes shipped in boxes, bales and bags.20 4
Chile, with the concurrence of Argentina, said the same rules should
apply to bulk and containerized cargo, however, there should be no
necessity for opening sealed containers or packages, and the shipper's
comments should be accepted. Singapore and Australia were in agree-
ment with Chile and Argentina. The Draft Proposals were too sweeping,
erroneously assuming that the carrier never played any part in the
packing of the container. There was a need for flexibility here rather than
rigid rules which would not allow for changes in commercial practice.
Germany stressed the close relationship between the question of
reservation and that of unit limitation of liability. Must the carrier
"'4 The Draft Proposals to be considered were:
Draft Proposal JJ
"A bill of lading shall be prima facie evidence of the receipt by the carrier of goods as therein
described, subject to the reservations permitted under para. 3 .... "
Draft Proposal J2
"When the carrier fails to note on the bill of lading the apparent order and condition of the
goods [including their packaging], or that freight charges are due on [arrival of] the shipment,
for the purpose of para. I he is deemed to have noted on the bill of lading that the goods
[including their packaging] were in apparent good order and condition and that no freight
charges would be due on [arrival of] the shipment."
Draft Proposal K
"The shipper shall be deemed to have guaranteed to the carrier the accuracy, at the time the
carrier took charge of the goods according to article [II A] of the marks, number, quantity,
and weight, as furnished by him, and the shipper shall indemnify the carrier against all loss,
damage or expense resulting from inaccuracies in such information. The shipper shall remain
responsible under such guarantee even if the bill of lading has been transferred to a third
party. The right of the carrier to such indemnity shall in no way limit his responsibility under
the contract of carriage to any person other than the shipper."
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accept liability on the basis of the shipper's description of the contents of
the container? It would be more appropriate to consider the whole
question in the context of the liability rule.
The General Debate had already considered Draft Proposals J-1 and
J-2 indirectly (See Paras. 74-77 supra), but the problem of bill of lading
contents as evidence against the carrier was not directly confronted. It
must be noted, however, that this question is also interlocked with the
questions of validity of reservations and letters of guaranty.
The I.N.S.A. observer noted that the shipper would have to prove the
truth of the information on the bill concerning which the reservations had
been lodged. Under consideration now was the question of the persons to
be affected by carrier reservations. The draft provisions confined the
legal effects to the parties to the contract, but the holder should not be
freed from these legal effects, because he received the bill complete with
reservations and reasons.
Japan said that in Draft Provision K there was no reason for the words
respecting a third party or a consignee. If the consignee was a holder he
was already covered. Germany agreed with Japan that the consignee was
logically a third party.
The U.S.S.R. noted that under the Hague Rules, disputed information
was omitted and it was therefore logical that the bill of lading should
constitute prima facie evidence of the receipt of the goods. As a result of
the change of approach in Draft Provision E it would be necessary to
change the wording of Draft Provision J-1. Also, it should be made clear
from whom the bill of lading was prima facie evidence, since the
Secretary General's Report gave the impression that it constituted such
evidence only for the shipper. The United States agreed with the
interpretation of the U.S.S.R.
Norway noted that courts have always considered the bill to have
evidentiary effect only as to the apparent condition of the goods. In view
of the fact that in Latin America the consignee was equated with the
shipper, the second part of Draft Provision J- 1 would have to be retained,
and if not expressly included, his right to the same protection as a third
party acting in good faith might not be recognized.
Egypt noted that under Egyptian law the consignee was considered to
be a party to the contract and thus enjoyed the same protection as a third
party acting in good faith.
Singapore feared that the Hague Rules and the draft provision did not
protect a bank which accepted a bill as collateral if it were not formally
assigned or transferred to the bank. Therefore, the provision should be
amended to read "transferred or pledged to a third party acting in good
faith, including any person having an interest in the goods." France
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disagreed, saying that any bank giving a loan became a holder. There
was no need to endorse the bill in favor of the bank for the bank to be
protected as a third party acting in good faith.
Prof. Honnold intervened that by accepting the bill as collateral, the
bank acquired rights in the bill, and in the case of default would
undoubtedly be considered the person to whom the bill had been
transferred.
Norway said that since the carrier's reservation might be based on lack
of knowledge, it would be desirable to provide that prima facie
evidentiary value be assessed on the basis of the description of the goods,
with due regard for any permissible reservations entered in it. This would
be more appropriate than a "subject to the reservations permitted"
proviso. The conclusive evidence rule should be drafted so as to protect
third parties misled by the description in the bill and acting in reliance on
that description to their detriment. The protection of third parties should
be based on estoppel, thus, a third party who had not acted in reliance on
the misleading information, even though "in good faith", should not be
given a cause of action. It should be made clear, however, that the
reference does not apply to a consignee who was also the shipper or the
shipper's representative. Other methods of protection were possible, such
as a cause of action for misrepresentation against a carrier who failed to
discover an inaccuracy he should have discovered.
Poland proposed a new Draft Provision:
"A bill of lading shall be prima facie evidence of the receipt by the
carrier of the goods as therein described, taking into account the
reservations permitted under para. 3 of the article."
Also, if specific mention of the consignee was deemed desirable, it
should read "a consignee who is not the shipper."
The United Kingdom noted that the rights of a third party transferee
were generally protected by law-in the U.K. by the "Misrepresentation
Act." The question was the rules of evidence, not a third party's right of
action. The estoppel rule was implicit in the cause of action-it was
unnecessary in a rule of evidence which presumed the existence of a cause
of action.
Belgium said that express mention of the consignee was necessary. The
contract of carriage was between the carrier and the shipper, and the
mere mention of the consignee in the bill would not, as had been said by
France, make him a party to the contract. France agreed with Belgium.
India said that if the shipper had stated 25 packages and the carrier
reserved that only 24 existed only one package should be allowed to be
disputed.
Norway said that the reason why some evidence should be primafacie
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and some conclusive was because certain holders had better rights than
others. The purpose of the distinction was not to facilitate rules of
evidence, but rather to protect the interests of commercial parties, in
particular the consignee's rights.
Chile disagreed with France that a consignee on a bill could not be the
shipper or the carrier. However, France said the consignee must always
be a moral person distinct from the shipper, otherwise, all actions would
be brought in the name of the consignee.
Prof. Honnold noted that draft provision J-2 provided the sanction for
failure to insert any of the notations required by the Convention; the
condition of the goods and freight charges. The carrier did not depend on
material furnished by the shipper for these. J-2 did not require the exact
amount to be stated, but rather was designed to remove doubts when the
Convention becomes part of national legislation.
Japan proposed the removal of any presumptions concerning freight
charge because commercial practice was contrary. Freight collect was
the rule and freight prepaid the exception.
Poland agreed with Japan, because normally a debtor must prove that
he paid his debt. It was not the rule that a creditor must prove that it had
been paid. These presumptions were a diabolical scheme against carriers.
France said Freight prepaid should be the presumption. J-2 would
thus facilitate the negotiability of bills of lading.
Norway said the presumption as to good condition stressed the duty of
the carrier to check the condition and disclose any defects, and would
thus introduce international uniformity. Respecting a presumption of
freight prepaid, however, a long tradition would be disturbed. He
proposed that, instead, if the bill specify that freight was prepaid, nothing
could be claimed from a consignee holding the bill in good faith; no
benefit then for the shipper.
Norway then offered a Draft Proposal
"A Bill of Lading shall be prima facie evidence as against the carrier of
the receipt by the carrier of the goods as therein described; however, proof
to the contrary by the carrier shall not be admissible when the bill of lad-
ing has been transferred to third party, including the consignee, who in
good faith has acted in reliance on the description of the goods in the bill
of lading. The foregoing shall not apply to particulars in the bill of lad-
ing in respect of which and to the extent that the carrier has made res-
ervation permitted under paras. 1 and 2 of this Article."
The United States said that commercial quotations on a C.I.F. basis
nevertheless permitted the carrier to ship "Freight Collect" after
deducting the amount of the freight from the invoice. Very often the
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decision about shipping "Freight Collect" or "Prepaid" depended on the
economic strength of the shipper and commercial practice left room for
both methods. The provision on the condition odf the goods conformed
with the commercial practice. He again noted his preference for the
optional treatment of the long list of 15 mandatory contents and noted
that if the provision requiring a notation were to be merely optional,
there would no problem of a presumption that freight was prepaid.
Because some systems of law permitted a lien for the carrier's unpaid
freight charges against the cargo itself, it would be unwise to legislate
extensively in this area in an international convention.
Chile felt that the presumption as to condition was not a sufficient
sanction in the case of intentional or malicious failure to enter the
various required particulars. For those cases there should be an
additional sanction, such as no maximum limit of carrier liability.
Argentina and Chile were dissatisfied with all existing proposals.
The USSR did not favor the presumption that freight has been paid in
J-2. He could, however, support the Norwegian proposal which protect-
ed only third parties in good faith and not the shipper.
Belgium felt the freight presumption should be removed from the
provision under discussion, or it should be confined to a statement as to
whether freight was prepaid or not.
Singapore said it was essential not to impose on the holder a
requirement to make enquiries on the question whether any freight
charges were due because the carrier often had no agent at the port of
discharge, and, in actuality, the presumption could be evaded easily by a
printed notation that, "The carrier is entitled to collect freight from the
consignee or other holder unless otherwise stated herein."
The Chairman then summarized the discussion and noted that by a
majority of 9 to 6 the Plenary was opposed to a Presumption respecting
Freight Prepaid.
At the Drafting Party Meeting the Chairman introduced alternative
texts taken from suggestions offered by France and USSR.
Alternative 1
2. The bill of lading shall be prima facie evidence of the taking over or,
where a shipped bill of lading is issued, loading by the carrier, of goods
as described in the bill of lading.
3. However, proof to the contrary [by the carrier] shall not be admissible
when the bill of lading has been transferred to a third party [including
the consignee] who in good faith has acted in reliance on the description
of the goods therein.
4. The provisions of paras 2 and 3 of this Article shall not apply to
particulars in respect of which and to the extent that the carrier has
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entered [in the bill of lading] reservation permitted under para. I of this
Article.
Alternative 2
2. Except for particulars in respect of which and to the extent that the carrier
has entered reservation permitted under para.1 of this Article:
(a) the bill of lading shall be prima facie evidence of the taking over or,
where a shipped bill of lading is issued, loading by the carrier of the
goods as described in bill of lading; and
(b) proof to the contrary [by the carrier] shall not be admissible when
the bill of lading has been transferred to a third party [including the
consignee] who in good faith has acted in reliance on the
description of the goods therein.
Subsequently these texts were extensively reworked by the Drafting
Group which included it as Article 16 of the new draft convention.
1. If the bill of lading contains particulars concerning the general nature,
leading marks, number of packages or pieces, weight or quantity of the
goods which the carrier has reasonable grounds for suspecting not
accurately to represent the goods actually taken over or, where a
"shipped" bill of lading is issued, loaded, or if he had no reasonable
means of checking such particulars, the carrier shall make special note
of these grounds or inaccuracies, or of the absence of reasonable means
of checking.
2. When the carrier fails to note on the bill of lading the apparent
condition of the goods, including their packaging, he is deemed to have
noted on the bill of lading that the goods, including their packaging,
were in apparent good condition.
3. Except for particulars in respect of which and to the extent to which a
reservation permitted under para.1 of this Article has been entered:
(a) the bill of lading shall beprimafacie evidence of the taking over or,
where a "shipped" bill of lading is issued, loading by the carrier of
the goods as described in the bill of lading; and
(b) proof to the contrary by the carrier shall not be admissible when the
bill of lading has been transferred to a third party, including any
consignee, who in good faith has acted in reliance on the
description of the goods therein.
Thereafter, as a result of a general debate on the question of the
evidentiary effect to be given a statement concerning the amount of
freight, the following additional provision was added:
4. A bill of lading which does not, as provided in paragraph 1,
subparagraph (k) of article 15, set forth the freight or otherwise
indicate that freight shall be payable by the consignee, shall be prima
facie evidence that no freight is payable by the consignee. However,
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proof to the contrary by the carrier shall not be admissible when the bill
of lading has been transferred to a third party, including any consignee,
who in good faith has acted in reliance on the absence in the bill of
lading of any such indication.
3. Documents other than the bill of lading
At the outset India indicated disapproval of any documents other than
the bill of lading because this would discourage attempts to by-pass the
new convention.
In reply it was noted that the provisions of the Convention would be
applicable to all contracts for the carriage of goods by sea. The purpose
of Draft Article A was to set forth the contents of a bill of lading, and not
to affect that principle. 20 5
Norway said the purpose of Draft Article A was to distinguish
between a bill of lading and other documents evidencing carriage. India's
question raised the important point of who would decide whether a bill of
lading, a mere consignment note, or no document at all would be the
method of reflecting the contract of carriage. Article 3(3) of the Hague
rules, and Draft Alternative B, gave the right to the shipper to demand
the issuance of a bill of lading, and in the second instance the right to
demand issuance of a document other than a bill of lading-i.e., a
consignment note.2 0 6 Norway suggested that information fed into a data
processing system should be treated in the same manner as information
fed into a document.
Singapore noted that a common situation was for a consignor to take
out a full set of shipping documents covering an entire bulk cargo. He
would then sell portions of the cargo to several consignees, and issue to
each a separate delivery note. In a recent case where the cargo had been
damaged before the owner of the delivery note had become owner of the
cargo, he had been denied a remedy from the consignor because the
delivery note was not equivalent to the bill of lading, and denied a
205Dra Proposal A
"Any promise or agreement made by or on behalf of the shipper to indemnify the carrier with
respect to any statement made in the bill of lading, or the omission of a statement required
under Article ( ), shall be void and of no effect."
216 Draft Proposal B
"Any promise or agreement made by or on behalf of the shipper to indemnify the carrier with
respect to any statement made in the bill of lading, or the omission of information required
under Article ( ), shall be void and of no effect if the carrier knew [or should reasonably have
known on the basis of facts apparent to him] that such a statement was incorrect or that the
inclusion of such information was required."
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remedy from the carrier because he had not been owner at the time of the
injury. In view of this decision, care should be taken to insure that the
definition adopted was wide enough to cover that type of situation.
The United States objected that the parties should not be required to
use a bill of lading if both agree that it is not necessary. At the same time,
one party should not be forced to use a particular type of document by
the other party. The United States strongly supported the suggestion that
information in automatic data processing systems be treated as informal
documentation evidencing the contract of carriage.
India agreed that the parties should not be forced to use particular
documents. However, producers are usually not familiar with transport
documents, and normally a bill of lading would be the document issued.
Chile felt that the ideal solution, in terms of uniformity, would be that
the bill of lading should be the only transport document used. However, a
large part of marine transport used other documents, such as charter
parties, therefore, the protections afforded by the Convention must apply
to all such documents, or its provisions could be evaded. Chile favored
Draft Proposal A, with the following addition:
"However the consignee or his successors will always have the right to
make applicable to those other documents all the rights, presumptions
and privileges that are given him with respect to the bill of lading and the
contract of carriage in this Convention." Argentina supported Chile.
The United States said that in view of the proposed mandatory
additions to the bill of lading, it would be a regressive step to require the
same contents for other documents.
The C.M.I. agreed with the United States, adding that the carrier
should not be in a position to avoid liability by refusing to issue a bill of
lading. Alternative A would be acceptable.
The United Kingdom favored Draft Alternative A, but thought it
unnecessary under the Common Law. Australia, Tanzania, and Nigeria
also supported Draft Provision A.
Chile said that where the consignee needed a document of title, he
should be given full protection. Since national legislation varied greatly,
a common rule imposing certain obligations on the carrier was desirable.
France noted it would be useful to include a provision making
transport documents, other than bills of lading issued by the carrier,
evidence of the receipt of the goods by him. Draft Alternative A was
acceptable, but without the unrealistic proposal of Chile. Once the
carrier and shipper had concluded a contract of carriage, the consignee
could not change it thereafter.
The I.N.S.A. preferred Draft Alternative A. Since the Chilean
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proposal would enable the consignee to give all documents the same
status as bills of lading it could not be accepted. Poland agreed and
favored Draft Alternative A.
Norway supported Draft Alternative A and criticized the Chilean
proposal as going too far. Some of the rules concerning bills of lading
should not apply to non-negotiable documents, such as the rule on
inadmissability of contrary evidence where a bill of lading has been
transferred to a good faith third party. The contents of other documents
should be left to commercial practice. Under the Warsaw Convention,
the airway bill was required to state only the place of departure and the
destination. Norway then proposed an amendment to Draft Alternative
A to the effect that the Convention applied to carriage of goods by sea in
all instances, whether or not a negotiable instrument was issued, except
in case of charter parties.
Chile again spoke on behalf of the proposal, arguing that it did not
allow the consignee to change a contract of carriage. Rather, it merely
stated the Working Group's intent to make the Convention applicable to
all contracts of carriage. However, in view of criticisms, Draft Proposal
A would be acceptable, and the Chilean proposal would be withdrawn.
It was noted that the rules on carrier liability were not subject to
derogation. The only flexibility was with respect to the provisions on the
contents to be included on a bill of lading.
Japan saw no need for documents other than bills of lading, but had no
objection to Draft Alternative A, without the Chilean proposal. The
U.S.S.R. supported this view.
Germany also favored Draft Proposal A, without the Chilean
amendment. As to the contents of other documents, the parties should
not have the right to declare the document negotiable so that a third
party might acquire the document on the basis of its representing goods.
Traders should not be misled into believing that a document was a bill of
lading.
Argentina supported the Chilean Proposal as an attempt to prevent
parties from escaping their responsibilities and avoid the scope of the
Convention. Other documents should at least identify the goods, name
the carrier who delivered them, and the person who was to receive them.
Norway proposed the following addition: (I) "However, the provisions
contained in article (15) shall only apply when a bill of lading has been
issued."
Belgium objected that the Norwegian amendment could only cause
confusion, France concurred, favoring Draft proposal A without amend-
ments.
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Chile would now prefer to have no provisions whatsoever rather than
draft provision A without clarifications.
India recognized the need for other documents, but felt they should
contain at least some basic information and also state the carrier's
responsibility. Anything less would amount to reopening the scope of the
Convention, accordingly, India favored draft proposal B.
Germany felt the problem was not serious, because the consignee
could always insist that the shipper demand the issuance of a bill of
lading. It was probable that bills of lading would be issued most of the
time. (It might be noted, however, that bills of lading are being phased
out in North Atlantic trades.)
Norway then withdrew the Norwegian proposal. The chairman's
summary recognized that a very large number of delegations had
endorsed Draft Proposal A which became the basis for the text as
approved.
Article 18. Documents other than bills of lading
When a carrier issues a document other than a bill of lading to evidence
a contract of carriage, such a document shall be prima facie evidence of
the taking over by the carrier of the goods as therein described.
P. Letters of Guarantee (or Indemnification)
This problem concerns the need to protect consignees from fraud
perpetrated by the shipper in collusion with the carrier.20 7 It is believed
that the negotiability of bills of lading in general will be protected by the
prevention of such collusion. The problem is created by the custom of
banks which deal with documentary credits requiring that drafts be
accompanied by, "a full set of clean, on-board bills of lading."
Customarily, when goods are received by the carrier he can note the
condition of the goods and their packing on the dock or mate's receipt
and on the bill of lading itself. There is a serious risk that carriers might
protect themselves by notations of defects on all receipts. However, such
practice is not widespread because it could become a competitive factor.
Article 16 of the "Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary
Credits, (1962) and the 1974 Revision" sum up the existing jurisprudence
to the effect that a "clean" shipping document bears no superimposed
2
0 7 Pomerene Bills of Lading Act 49 U.S.C. 121 (1970) "Any person who, knowingly or with
intent to defraud, falsely makes, alters, forges, counterfeits, prints or photographs any bill of
lading. . . or issues or aids in issuing or procuring the issue of, or negotiates or transfers for
value a bill which contains a false statement as to the receipt of the goods, or as to any other
matter . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction, shall be punished for
each offense by imprisonment not exceeding five years .. ."
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clause or notation which expressly declares a defective condition of the
goods and/or the packaging. Banks may refuse shipping documents
bearing such clauses or notations unless the letter of credit expressly
states clauses or notations which may be accepted.2 °8
Norway noted that the purpose of Draft Provision K was to make the
shipper responsible for incorrect information supplied by him and
included on the bill of lading (prepared by the shipper). 20 9 In practice the
carrier will carry the goods and the shipper will give to the carrier a letter
of guarantee, holding the carrier harmless in a legal action brought by
the consignee. Thus, the carrier has two bases of liability to use against
the shipper. Under Draft Provision B, a carrier could not invoke a letter
of guarantee when the carrier knew that the shipper's statements were
inaccurate. Under Draft K, however, the carrier could still sue under the
contract. This inconsistency was not advisable, and Draft Provisions K
and B must be harmonized.
France said that a decision should first be reached on Draft K. Under
French law, the letter of guarantee remained valid only as between
shipper and carrier. It was invalid with respect to third parties. This
should be the model.
Poland felt that the provisions B and K were not that closely linked.
All the letter of guarantee accomplished was to confirm the implied
guarantees in Draft Provision K.
France said the Hague Rules did not specify how far the guarantee
went. A shipper could argue that the guarantee ended upon transfer to a
203 In this country the bill of lading is considered clean if the notation is a mere disclaimer of
carrier liability for some conditions not listed in the printed bill of lading. See Liberty National Bank
v. Bank of America 218 F2d 831 (10th Cir., 1955). (The fact that the disclaimer notation keeps the
bill of lading clean does not affect the possible invalidity of the notation under COGSA 1303 (8);
H.R. III (8).) However, if the notation is descriptive of specific defects the bill is considered "foul"
so that the bank would be entitled to dishonor the draft for non-compliance with the terms of the
credit. It is in these circumstances that the shipper may ask the carrier to issue a clean bill so as to
expedite the documentary credit. In this country, if the carrier does issue a clean bill of lading under
a letter of guarantee or indemnity from the shipper, the carrier will be estopped to deny the bad
packing or bad condition of the goods upon suit by the consignee. See Molinilli Giannusa & Rao v.
Navigazione Libera Triestina, 53 F.2d 374 (2d Cir., 1931) and Continex Inc. v. S.S. Flying
Independent 106 F.Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y., 1952). The desirable goal is protection of the consignee
from fraud, and it is doubted whether international legislation is necessary to achieve that goal.
209 Draft proposal K is found at fn. 203 (supra.). Draft proposal A is found at fn. 205 (supra).
Draft proposal B is found at fn. 206 (supra).
Draft Proposal C
"When the carrier knowingly states inaccurate information in the bill of lading or omits any
information required to be included under Article ( ) he shall be responsible to the consignee
or other third party to whom the bill of lading has been transferred, for any loss, damage or
expense incurred in good faith by such third person as a result of such statement or omission
without the benefit of the limitation on carrier liability provided for in this Convention."
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third party. Draft Proposal K gave the carrier the legal certainty that the
shipper's obligation continued after transfer of the bill of lading.
The United States said K was acceptable since it did clear up an
ambiguity. Thereafter, Argentina, Japan, Singapore, U.S.S.R., Chile
and Tanzania approved Draft Proposal K.
Accordingly, Proposal K was considered adopted, Norway reserving
its position as to a future combination of K & B, and the debate returned
to a consideration of Draft Proposals A, B, and C.
France argued that Draft Proposal "A" was much too radical. It
purported to render null and void all letters of guarantee. Draft Proposal
B was unacceptable also as impractical, since the letter would be void
only if the carrier knew of the inaccuracy of the statement made in the
bill of lading, thus introducing a difficult question of proof and
uncertainty as to the validity of the letter. This criticism also applied to
Draft C. It required that the carrier "knowingly" stated incorrect
information or omitted any required information. French law was the
best solution. The letter remained valid between shipper and carrier, but
could not be invoked against a third party. A proposal to this effect was
made from French law in conformity with the principle that an
agreement between two parties could not injure the rights of third
parties, as follows:
Text of article 20 of the Act of 18 June 1966:
Any letter or agreement by which the shipper undertakes to indemnify
the carrier where the latter or his representative has consented to issue a
bill of lading containing no qualifications shall be null and void as against
third parties, who may, however, rely on the letter or agreement as against
the shipper.
Where a qualification has been intentionally omitted and relates to a
defect in the goods of which the carrier knew or should have known when
signing the bill of lading, he may not rely on that defect to avoid his
liability and shall not benefit from the limitation of liability provided for
in article 28 below.
Proposed variant by France to combine the paragraphs:
Any letter or agreement by which the shipper undertakes to indemnify
the carrier where the latter or his representative has consented to issue a
bill of lading containing incorrect statements or omitting any information
required to be included under [Article 15] shall be null and void as against
the consignee or any third party to whom the bill of lading is transferred,
but shall render the shipper liable to any such person for any loss, damage
or expense resulting from the statements or omissions.
Japan argued that the entire subject of letters of guarantee should be
left out of the Convention, since the letter had effect only between the
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carrier and the shipper and not against third parties. The letter benefited
only the shippers, allowing them to obtain a clean bill of lading for letter
of credit purposes. If the subject had to be regulated in the Convention,
then the French proposal was acceptable, but it was better to omit it.
Argentina said the French proposal was acceptable, however, it should
be made clear that unit limitation of liability did not apply where certain
facts were concealed by agreement between the carrier and the shipper.
France agreed with Argentina, and added a sentence to that effect, at
which point Japan said that with that addition the French proposal was
no longer acceptable.
Chile said that the French proposal was acceptable, except that the
concept of carrier knowledge should be eliminated. If the carrier
consented to issue a clean bill of lading against a letter of guarantee, he
must be presumed to know of some defect. A requirement of good faith
dealing would cover the case where the shipper and consignee were
legally the same person.
Germany stressed that the economic importance of the letter of
guarantee should be recognized. In most judicial tests of its validity, the
decisive test was the existence of fraud on consignees, however, Germany
was inclined to the view that the convention should remain silent on the
subject, due to wide differences between various legal systems on
questions of fraud.
The U.S.S.R. supported the position of Japan. The whole subject
could be left out of the convention since commercial practice appeared to
be satisfactory. If the subject must be included in the convention, the rule
should be flexible, thus the French proposal could be used as the basis of
discussions. As to the relation to the unit limitation of liability, the draft
convention already covered that because a carrier issuing a clean bill of
lading in bad faith would lose the unit limitation due to wilful
misconduct.
Nigeria favored Draft Proposal A. Such letters should never be valid
under any circumstances. Draft Proposal B, because of the difficulty of
establishing lack of knowledge, could not be supported. If compromise
were necessary the French Proposal could be used as the basis.
Norway argued that any draft provision should be an overall solution
based on K, B and C. The French proposal did not solve the problems
involved. The entire subject matter must be regulated in the new
convention, however, because it was inadvisable for the new convention
to enter into the area of sales law (the relationship between the shipper
and the third party buyer) the only relevant relationships were those
between the carrier and the third party, and between the carrier and the
shipper and this convention should regulate those relationships. Draft B
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was preferable to A because, in a bona fide dispute, the letter would be a
useful method of dispute settlement. Invalidation of the letter would hurt
only the seller, because the carrier would have made reservations in the
bill of lading. India agreed with Norway that the subject must be in the
Convention. The letter of guarantee could be accepted if the rights of
third parties were safeguarded.
The observer from The International Chamber of Shipping said that
letters of guarantee were generally issued when there was a genuine
dispute between carrier and shipper. There seldom was a conspiracy.
Instead, there was usually shipper pressure and carrier resistance
especially as to date of shipment. It must also be noted that the carrier
would forfeit his P & I coverage by conspiring with the shipper. Draft
provision A goes much too far. Draft B would produce considerable
litigation since it was too unclear. Accordingly he supported the view of
the United States and Japan that the entire subject should be omitted.
The United States said that an overall solution was impossible,
although the French proposal would provide a basis for the Drafting
Party if the Plenary believed the subject should be in the convention. At
the root of the problem the banks wanted flexibility, not exact rules, re-
specting tenders of documentary credits, and this Convention could
have no control over them. Draft "A" could not be supported because
letters were useful in bona fide disputes between carrier and shipper.
The relationship between shipper and carrier should be left to national
legislation.
Once letters of guarantee were permitted the problem is the danger of
fraud on the consignee by collusion of shipper and carrier. National law
might provide that in order to discourage fraud there would be no right
of contribution between joint tortfeasors (shipper and carrier) and that
this would remove the temptation for carrier assistance in shipper frauds
because the carrier would be the one sued in case the shipper could not be
made subject to the jurisdiction of the courts in the consignee's country.
National law might also provide that the defrauder is liable, without the
possibility of limitation of liability, for deceit which would carry with it
the right to expanded consequential damages (such as economic loss) and
punitive damages. Because of uncertainty as to the carrier's rights to unit
limitation, an American consignee would probably not seek to use the
maritime law or the Admiralty forum but instead would assert his rights
under the common law in the state courts, although he would not be able
to use the "In Rem" process to seize the offending vessel. With respect to
discouraging fraud and protecting consignees, the optimum provision
from the American viewpoint would be the Maritime action against the
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carrier (using "In Rem" Process) which would follow the measure of
damages rules of the common law for consequential and punitive
damages.
When it comes to the problem of the rights between the two
tortfeasors, the carrier and the shipper, the question should not be
included in the Convention but should be left to national law, preferably
so that the carrier would have no right to enforce contribution from the
shipper where both have acted fraudulently towards the consignee. It was
with respect to the carrier-shipper relation that a question of constitu-
tional law and states' rights would be raised in the United States. 210 It
could be maintained that the action by carrier against shipper was not a
traditional maritime action, although it might also be argued that such a
claim could easily be made "pendent" to claims of the carrier arising
under maritime law. The proposed symmetrical treatment of the entire
subject in the convention could also result in an inequity because the
consignee's action against the carrier would be subject to unit limitation
of liability whereas the carrier's action against the shipper would not be
so limited. Although federal states often used constitutional arguments
as a shield to ward off unpleasant subjects in international discussions, it
might be that this constitutional problem, although minor, had some
relevance now because it was not really necessary to include the recourse
action by the carrier except for reasons of symmetrical treatment.
Finally, the United States argued that the subject of letters of guarantee
had not been in the 1924 Convention and need not be introduced at this
point.
There seemed to be three possible approaches now: approve all let-
ters of guarantee; approve no letters of guarantee; and approve some
letters of guarantee. The first alternative was out of the question because
letters of guarantee could be used in fraudulent schemes. The second
alternative was also out of the question because commercial practice
demands the use of such letters in legitimate disputes. If we are to
approve some letters and disapprove others, then we are set on a course
210Under the maritime law the consignee will have an action against the carrier for lost or
damaged goods in accordance with COGSA. See Dempsey & Assoc. v. S.S. Sea Star, 461 F.2d 1009
(2d Cir. 1972); and Cummins Sales & Service Inc. v. Institute of London Underwriters, 476 F.2d
498 (5th Cir., 1973). Further, the consignee has a civil action (not in Admiralty) against the carrier
for fraud. See The Carso, 53 F.2d 374 (2nd Cir. 1931); Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. Gano Moore & Co.,
298 F.343 (S.D.N.Y. 1934); Toko Bussan Kaisha Ltd. v. American President Lines, 155 F.Supp.
886 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), affirmed 265 F.2d 418 (2nd Cir. 1959); Freedman v. Nordeutscher Lloyd 22
Misc. 2d 397, 199 N.Y.S.2d 709 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1960).
The consignee's action against the shipper would also be a civil action for intentional fraud.
Unfortunately there is no case law directly on point, but this would be the consequence of dicta in
Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. Gano Moore & Co. 298 F. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
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where complete legislation into all relationships and not the partial
regulation by Draft Proposal B was necessary. Therefore, the only
sensible suggestion seemed to be the omission of the subject of letters of
guarantee from the new convention, as stated by Japan and U.S.S.R.
The United Kingdom agreed with the United States that neither Draft
Proposal A or B or C was acceptable. Draft Proposal B had a hidden
danger in the carrier knowledge provision which would kill letters of
guarantee.
Tanzania said that the French proposal furnished a useful basis for
drafting. International trade would not be hindered by such a proposal,
and it was important that consignees' rights be safeguarded as much as
possible, which the French proposal would accomplish.
The I.U.M.I. observer said that Marine insurers rarely saw a letter,
but those they did see were generally in fraudulent situations. Marine
insurers had been unwilling to render insurance null and void when a
letter was issued. It was likely that as the trend towards unitization of
cargoes progressed, the use of honest letters would increase. The
convention should deal with the subject, because the rules for prima facie
proof gave opportunities for fraudulent letters of guarantee. The
situation required uniform international treatment.
Argentina argued that there was a need to clarify the position of the
consignee, which varied in different national legislations. Norway
apparently regarded the consignee as a third party to the maritime
transaction, while in Latin America he was a party to the contract of
carriage.
Norway noted that it was important to draw a distinction between
parties to a letter of guarantee and parties to a contract of carriage. It
was at this point that Norway introduced a new draft proposal
combining Draft Proposals B, C and K, as follows:
1. The shipper shall be deemed to have guaranteed to the carrier the ac-
curacy of particulars relating to the nature of the goods, their marks,
number, quantity and weight, as furnished by him for insertion in the
bill of lading. The shipper shall indemnify the carrier against all
loss, damage or expense resulting from inaccuracies of such particu-
lars. The shipper shall remain liable even if the bill of lading has been
transferred to a third party. The right of the carrier to such indemnity
shall in no way limit his liability under the contract of carriage to any
other person than the shipper.
2. Where the carrier has intentionally omitted to enter reservations in
the bill of lading with respect to particulars furnished by the shipper
on the apparent condition of the goods, including their packaging,
and the carrier knows that the description of the goods as a conse-
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quence thereof will be misleading for any third party holder of the
bill of lading
(a) any promise or agreement made by or on behalf of the shipper
to indemnify the carrier with respect to such omission shall be
void and of no effect;
(b) The carrier shall have no right to indemnity from the shipper
pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article;
(c) the carrier shall be liable for any loss, damage or expense in-
curred by any third party holder of the bill of lading who has
acted in reliance on the description of the goods in the bill of
lading, without the benefit of the limitation of liability provided
for in this Convention.
Norway argued that his draft was a compromise between the French
view in favor of the status quo on letters of guarantee and the view of
those who would eliminate letters of guarantee completely.
The Norwegian proposal was quickly supported by Singapore and
Australia while France reiterated its position, stating that the Norwegian
proposal would attempt the impossible-validating the letter of guaran-
tee as between carrier and shipper and invalidating it as between carrier
and third parties.
The Chairman indicated that the French Proposal probably had the
support of 5 states for a first choice and 4 more for a second choice, but
that this was not a clear direction to the Drafting Party.
The chairman then said four questions had to be decided:
1-Are letters of guarantee invalid against third parties acting in good
faith, including the consignee? The vote was 11 yes; I no; 2 abstentions.
2-Are letters of guarantee invalid as between carrier and shipper? (a) in
all cases? The vote was 0 yes; 16 no; 2 abstentions. (b) in some cases?
The vote was 9 yes; 6 no; 2 abstentions.
3-Should there be a provision on the liability of the carrier to third
parties, including the consignee? The vote was 11 yes; 2 no; 4
abstentions.
4-Should there be a provision making the shipper liable to third parties,
including the consignee? The vote was 3 yes; 7 no; 6 abstentions.
During a long debate before the Drafting Party the Norwegian
proposal gained additional support so that the end result did not
resemble the French Proposal which had once appeared to have majority
support, but came to resemble the Norwegian proposal.
At the Second Reading the United States, supported by C.M.I., I.C.S.
and I.C.C., proposed again to eliminate the provision completely. There
was an extensive debate, but there was not enough support among the
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voting delegations so that the provisions were incorporated in the draft
text as Article 17:
Article 17. Guarantees by the shipper
1. The shipper shall be deemed to have guaranteed to the carrier the
accuracy of particulars relating to the general nature of the goods, their
marks, number, weight and quantity as furnished by him for insertion in
the bill of lading. The shipper shall indemnify the carrier against all loss,
damage or expense resulting from inaccuracies of such particulars. The
shipper shall remain liable even if the bill of lading has been transferred by
him. The right of the carrier to such indemnity shall in no way limit his
liability under the contract of carriage to any person other than the
shipper.
2. Any letter of guarantee or agreement by which the shipper under-
takes to indemnify the carrier against loss, damage or expense resulting
from the issuance of the bill of lading by the carrier, or a person acting on
his behalf, without entering a reservation relating to particulars furnished
by the shipper for insertion in the bill of lading, or to the apparent
condition of the goods, shall be void and of no effect as against any third
party, including any consignee, to whom the bill of lading has been
transferred.
3. Such letter of guarantee or agreement shall be valid as against the
shipper unless the carrier or the person acting on his behalf, by omitting
the reservation referred to in paragraph 2 of this article, intends to defraud
a third party, including any consignee, who acts in reliance on the
description of the goods in the bill of lading. If in such a case, the
reservation omitted relates to particulars furnished by the shipper for
insertion in the bill of lading, the carrier shall have no right of indemnity
from the shipper pursuant to paragraph 1 of this article.
4. In the case referred to in paragraph 3 of this article the carrier shall
be liable, without the benefit of the limitation of liability provided for in
this Convention, for any loss, damage or expense incurred by a third party,
including a consignee, who has acted in reliance on the description of the
goods in the bill of lading issued.*
* In regard to drafting changes that may be necessary, see section B, footnote 17, of the
Report of the Working Group on International Legislation on Shipping on the work of its
eighth session, 10 to 21 February 1975 (A/CN.9/105).The United States position continues
to oppose Article 17, especially paragraphs 3 and 4.
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